Background Report on the Exclusionary Rule

Abstract: The exclusionary rule refers to the judicially crafted remedy prohibiting the government from admitting at trial evidence gained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights. The rule

was developed in the context of unlawful searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but is also applied to violations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. In the Fourth Amendment context, the rule primarily acts to deter future unlawful action by police officers. The Supreme Court has crafted several exceptions to the rule which admit improperly gained evidence when the deterrence value of exclusion would be at a minimum. This brief background explores the grounds and rationale for exclusion; the application of the several limitations on its scope, and its administration at trial.

 I.        Why Exclusion: The History, Bases, and Rationale for the ‘Exclusionary Rule’

 The “exclusionary rule” is a judicially crafted remedy which prohibits the government from using evidence obtained in contradiction of a defendant’s constitutional rights in its case in chief at trial. This can include suppression not only of physical evidence discovered by police, but also witness statements, and admissions by the accused party. The term “exclusionary rule” is usually used in connection with evidence obtained by violation of the Fourth Amendment proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures, but the Supreme Court has held that evidence may also be excluded under the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, or even as integral to constitutional due process. While the different constitutional guarantees sometimes provide different rationales for exclusion, a number of common issues prevail making generalized discussion of exclusion possible. Still, differences in the constitutional bases for exclusion do occasionally affect the scope of evidence suppressed, making it important to understand why each Amendment calls for exclusion, and how such differences might affect application.

Bases for Excluding Evidence:

 The Fifth Amendment provides that “no person [] shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The Court has found that because the Fifth Amendment directly addresses the prohibition of certain evidence, it naturally demands its own exclusionary rule as a remedy for violations.2 When a statement is obtained in such a way that a defendant can be said to have been compelled to incriminate himself, meaning that an admission was made involuntarily, the Fifth Amendment bars the use of that statement at trial. The well known ‘Miranda rules’, requiring that persons subject to custodial interrogation be informed of their rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, also arise from Fifth Amendment rights; and a failure to so inform, or to honor these rights, can result in exclusion.3 The Miranda warnings are seen as prophylactic of Fifth Amendment violations, and a failure to warn, or comply with these rights, creates a presumption that any statements made were improperly compelled and inadmissible.4

The Sixth Amendment entitles the accused to the right to confront witnesses against him and the ‘assistance of counsel’ at all critical stages of the criminal process. The presence of counsel is considered so crucial to the accused’s ability to effectively defend himself that the absence of counsel (other than by voluntary and knowing waiver of this right) risks exclusion of evidence at trial. This means that after the right to counsel has attached ( “at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against [the defendant], whether by formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”5), and the defendant has requested an attorney, police may not deliberately elicit statements

from the accused without risking the suppression of that evidence. 6 Counsel must also be notified in advance and be present at any identification procedures his client attends so that he might prevent any irregularities and be better poised to challenge the identifying witness at trial.7 The Court has offered two justifications for using exclusion as a remedy to state interference with the attorney-client relationship.

The first is that the constitutional violation in these cases is the use of improperly acquired evidence against the defendant at trial, so that exclusion prevents the injury.8 The alternative, akin to that in Fourth Amendment violations, is that penalizing police misconduct will deter the police from engaging in such behavior in the future.9

Some misconduct by police is seen to run directly afoul of the accused’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. This is true in situations where police practice creates a high likelihood of acquiring unreliable evidence, such as when an identification procedure obviously encourages a preordained result.10  Here, the unreasonable bias such evidence would create at trial justifies its exclusion. Due process        also mandates exclusion of evidence acquired by police tactics “so offensive to a civilized system that they must be condemned,” such as use of physical violence in interrogation. 11 The grounds for exclusion here, as in Fourth Amendment cases, is again the need to deter such egregious police conduct.12

Fourth Amendment exclusion (most often identified as the “exclusionary rule”) is a judicially created remedy designed to deter unlawful police searches and seizures. Much of the law concerning the scope and application of the exclusionary rule has been developed in the context of the Fourth Amendment and later applied to other constitutional violations. The Amendment requires that searches be reasonable, which generally requires that police have probable cause to search, obtain a warrant which states the area and targets of the search with particularity, and announce their presence when executing

the search. The Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment guarantee means little if illegally seized evidence can still be used against the defendant at court and that such evidence must always be excluded if the Amendment is to have force.13 While use of the exclusionary rule has previously been justified as preserving the integrity and trustworthiness of courts by refusing any contact with improperly obtained evidence, it is now generally accepted that the rule primarily functions by removing the incentive to disregard Constitutional requirements. 14 That unconstitutional practices can lead to the loss of vital evidence and undo police investigative work is meant to discourage officers from engaging in such behaviors. This deterrence value is not specific to any given case or police force but is accomplished over time by the courts repeatedly highlighting the seriousness of such Constitutional offenses and bringing Fourth Amendment values to the forefront of police consciousness.15

It is worth mentioning that suppression of evidence is sometimes the remedy for non- constitutional offenses as well. A prominent example is the “McNabb-Mallory” exclusion of statements made by an arrested person who is not promptly brought before the judiciary for a hearing. Here exclusion is based upon federal statutory requirements codifying the common law “presentment rule” which was meant to prevent secret detentions and inform the suspect of the charges against him.16 While such legislation requires only that arrested persons be presented “without unreasonable delay” and has never expressly called for exclusion of evidence gathered in its violation, the Supreme Court has found that the policy of the law would be circumvented if such evidence were allowed to serve as the basis for conviction. Congress has responded to the Court’s use of an exclusionary rule by creating a ‘safe-harbor’ provision limiting its application: otherwise admissible confessions made within six hours of a suspect’s arrest are no longer excluded solely because they were made before presentation.17

1. The Development of the Exclusionary Remedy.

Rights imply remedies for their violation, but the American Constitution is silent as to the appropriate remedy for violations of many of the fundamental provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Amendments mentioned above speak to the process of criminal investigation and rights at trial, but only in the vaguest of terms. Supreme Court interpretation of these provisions, however, has clarified their full reach and their mechanisms for enforcement have become clear.

American courts exercise the power of judicial review to interpret the Constitution and determine if the acts of other government branches are in accord with its mandates.18 Constitutional review is not specifically articulated in the Constitution, but has been read as a necessary ingredient in ensuring that all laws and government actions are in conformity with the Constitution, and thus acts as a check on the legislative and executive branches. While state and federal courts all exercise constitutional review, the Supreme Court is the ultimate judicial authority as to whether the laws and actions of local, state and federal governments are repugnant to the Constitution. This is not a power the Court takes lightly, acknowledging the difficulty of reversing its constitutional precedent, and also appreciating the need for the nation’s highest law to be settled and not subject to constant fluctuations with the political climate.19 After all, if a rule is found to be required by the Constitution, then it is part of the highest law of the land, and cannot be changed by legislative action but only by further action by the Court. The Court therefore considers constitutionality only in the context of actual controversies and cases and will not offer advisory opinions as to constitutionality, or entertain hypothetical challenges to a law.

The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren (1953-1969) was characterized by expansive liberal interpretations of the Constitution. In the area of criminal procedure, this trend was particularly striking, and has often been termed a ‘revolution’ in that it found many new constitutional protections of the individual against government investigation and prosecution. The Warren Court critically found that these rights were also applicable against state government actions, where the vast majority of law

enforcement activity occurs, as well as the federal government. While the Warren Court has sometimes been criticized for protecting the guilty at the expense of effective police power, it is now difficult to imagine American law without many of the protections it announced and which we now take for granted. These include the right to be provided free independent counsel, the requirement that police officers inform custodial suspects of their rights to remain silent when questioned, and the extension to the states of the “exclusionary rule.”

Following the period of expansion during the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution, later Supreme Court decisions have demonstrated an increasing reluctance to automatically apply the rule. The Court now finds exclusion to be a remedy of last resort rather than a necessary consequence of constitutional violations.20  Where the Warren Court had found the rule to be “part and parcel” to the

Fourth Amendment21, the Court now agrees that the rule is merely a judicially created remedy.22 Over the

last three decades, the Court has crafted a series of exceptions to the rule which permit the use at trial of otherwise reliable evidence previously excluded under the rule, and has limited the forums at which the rule is applicable. In so doing, the Court focuses narrowly on the deterrence grounds of the rule, refusing to apply it where the costs of the rule outweigh the deterrent value.23  The costs referred to include the need to ignore otherwise reliable evidence and sometimes even releasing obviously guilty and potentially dangerous criminals. The largely speculative future deterrent benefit is often found lacking in comparison to the tangible immediate costs presented at trial. Still, the exclusion of evidence remains a regular issue in criminal cases.

1. Framing the Exclusionary Rule Debate:

Emphasis on the deterrence rationale for exclusion has made the cost/ benefit analysis central to the exclusionary rule debate, with critics arguing that turning a blind eye to the truth by excluding evidence is almost never justified. Defenders of the rule argue that the “costs” of the exclusionary rule are actually imposed by the Constitution itself and not the exclusionary rule remedy. Any effective enforcement of constitutional limits on police methodology will lead to the loss of some evidence; if not by exclusion, then by directly blocking the acquisition of that evidence.24 Critics of the rule counter that the exclusionary rule in fact excludes more than the constitution requires, such as when merely sloppy police work leads to technical violations excluding evidence that would have been lawfully discovered by other means. 25 Not surprisingly, these situations are precisely where the Court has now found exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Still, because the exclusionary rule, by definition, only operates when incriminating evidence has already been found as the result of an illegal search, and is in the hands of police, it is difficult to watch the guilty go free while being unable to conclusively prove that any constitutional violations were actually deterred by the exclusionary rule.

Attempting to make the benefits of the exclusionary rule more concretely apparent, defenders often point to empirical studies and anecdotal evidence which attempts to quantify changes in police behavior resulting from the rule. These studies show that evidence is in fact rarely excluded, and even more rarely are convictions entirely lost due to exclusion.26  Those cases that are lost tend to concern possession charges, where seized contraband is the determinative evidence, and are rarely violent crimes.27 Researchers have also shown drastic increases in requests for search warrants following the extension of the rule to the states, implying that police did begin conforming their behavior to the constitution after the remedy was introduced.28 Police training materials also began to reflect the increased importance of complying with constitutional limits on search and seizure.

Critics argue that such empirical data is difficult to accurately gather and more difficult to fully explain.29 Low suppression rates might only reflect that crooked police now also perjure themselves to appear in compliance with the constitution, or that judges apply the rule unevenly.30  It would be cynical however, to suggest that this outcome is somehow specific to the exclusionary rule, and unlikely to result

from any strict remedy. It does seem clear however, that whether or not the rule is an ideal remedy for constitutional violations, it has made police and civilians more aware of constitutional rights and has brought these issues to the forefront of law enforcement.

Another major point of contention in the exclusionary rule debate is that the rule only indirectly protects the innocent. Only the guilty find themselves in a position to avail themselves of the rule’s protection and thus receive an unjustified benefit while the truly innocent victims of an unlawful search must look for other remedies. The Supreme Court has already acknowledged however, that the rule is not an individual right, nor is it meant to repair the individual injury, crafted instead with an eye only towards deterring future violations.31 Still, that the rule is invoked by criminal defendants leads critics to argue that penalties against police officers would be a more appropriate remedy, providing similar deterrence to police misconduct, but also providing relief directly to the innocent victims. In recent cases, the Court has found that the availability of alternative tort and administrative remedies does justify reduced reliance on the exclusionary rule.32 Supporters of the rule however find that such remedies are not yet sufficiently viable as to create a real deterrence effect and that they would still result in a windfall to the guilty as police would be over-deterred by direct penalties and be less likely to perform any searches.

There is also the fundamental question of the rule’s efficacy as a deterrent. Critics argue that the rule’s impact at the trial phase is unlikely to impact police behavior on the street. Police are more concerned with arrests than convictions, so the rule punishes prosecutors more than police officers. The

focus on prosecutions also means that unlawful police conduct aimed at other goals, such as to confiscate contraband or merely to harass, would be totally uninfluenced by the rule. Violations by officers who already mistakenly believe that they are in compliance with the law also cannot be effectively deterred. Defenders of the rule argue that these criticisms miss the point of the rule, which is not concerned with the individual violation, but with systemic change raising awareness of the constitutional issues to promote compliance. While it is nearly impossible to prove that more violations would occur in the absence of the rule, its supporters point to the increased prevalence of constitutional law training material for police and the resulting improvements of police professionalism following the rule’s application        to state governments. Ironically, this rise in police professionalism has in turn been cited as evidence   that the rule is no longer necessary.33

II.      What Evidence is Excluded: Reach and Limits on the Scope of Exclusion

 Primary and Derivative Evidence (Fruits of the Poisonous Tree)

The exclusionary rule not only prohibits the use of that evidence which is actually seized during the course of an unlawful search or seizure, but also that which is obtained indirectly as a result of that search. 34 Any evidence which would have been obtainable as the result of a lawful search or seizure is considered primary evidence, while evidence acquired through the exploitation of information gained in the illegal search is called secondary or derivative. Derivative evidence tainted by a violation can include not only physical evidence, but also statements and confessions obtained through an illegal arrest, 35 testimony of witnesses whose identities were discovered in a search,36 and even the defendant’s own testimony if compelled by exploitation of the illegality. A drug cache found only as the result of a statement made by an unlawfully arrested suspect would therefore not be admissible as it arose only from exploitation of the illegal arrest. Were such evidence not excluded, it would undermine the rule’s deterrent value, because police might continue using illegal investigatory practices knowing they could ultimately lead to some admissible evidence.37 A rule limiting the gathering of evidence can only be effective if that evidence is not allowed for any purpose at all, neither in court as proof, nor as a means of acquiring more evidence.38 This exclusion of derivative evidence is commonly described as the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.’39

While the prohibition of tainted derivative evidence was first formulated in the Fourth  Amendment search and seizure context, it has come to be used in other exclusionary contexts as well. In the Sixth Amendment context, for example, a line-up identification procedure performed in the absence of counsel not only requires the exclusion of the identification, but also the exclusion of any subsequent in- court identification based on that line-up.40  In Kastigar v. United States, the Court held that Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination similarly prevents the derivative fruits of coerced testimony. 41  Fifth Amendment exclusion of secondary evidence is thus similar to that under the Fourth, but it is unclear if their scope is precisely the same. One notable exception is that the ban on tainted secondary evidence does not apply when the only violation was a technical failure to give Miranda warnings before a custodial interrogation. Because the Miranda warnings are a prophylactic measure meant to prevent the use of involuntary testimony, evidence arising from an otherwise voluntary statement need not be excluded.42

1. Attenuation

 Not all tainted derivative evidence will be excluded, as some evidence discovered as the result of a constitutional violation is considered too remote or attenuated from the violation to justify exclusion. If, for example, a confession is separated from an illegal arrest by an intervening independent act of free will, the confession is considered sufficiently remote from the violation to be admitted. This is the case when an unlawfully arrested individual is released, but later voluntarily returns and confesses. 43 While receiving Miranda warnings prior to a confession is seen as a means of guaranteeing that statements made after   will be voluntary, the mere reading of “Miranda warnings alone []cannot always make the [confession]sufficiently a product of free will to break []the causal connection between the illegality and the confession.”44  Other factors which may be useful in determining whether an act is sufficiently voluntary to break the connection include the length of time between the violation and confession, the presence of further intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.45 A categorical decision to include evidence seems to have been made as to statements made incident to arrests executed with appropriate probable cause but inside the suspect’s home as prohibited by the Fourth Amendment: statements later made outside the home are considered sufficiently attenuated from the illegal arrest.46

Testimony by witnesses identified through exploitation of a constitutional violation may also be admitted when shown to be separated from the unlawful behavior by the witness’s own free will. Unlike physical evidence which is simply found as the result of improper investigation, witnesses are independent actors capable of choosing to testify, or not, on their own volition.47 To determine whether a witness’s testimony should be excluded when the witness was discovered as the result of a violation, courts consider (1) the willingness of the witness to offer testimony, (2) the role or importance of the violation in identifying the witness, (3) the proximity of the violation to the issues of the case and to the witness’s willingness to testify and (4) police motivation in conducting the unlawful search.48

Another special situation arises when the accused confesses on several distinct occasions, because it can be difficult to determine if all the confessions are tainted by an initial constitutional violation. The Court has acknowledged that once a person has confessed to a crime for any reason, it becomes psychologically easier for them to do so again. Thus, when the initial confession is the product of unlawful conduct, any subsequent confessions are to some extent derivative of the first.49 The Court has rejected      a blanket rule excluding all later confessions, and instead considers the way in which the first confession was unlawfully acquired. When the initial confession was inadmissible because it was                involuntary as prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, the Court asks whether the forces that compelled the first confession also influenced the second.50 When the initial confession resulted from a Fourth Amendment violation such as unlawful arrest, the Court has considered instead whether the second confession was influenced by having made a prior confession. 51 The two inquiries, distinct due to the different grounds for exclusion under each Amendment, are similar in practice, both questioning the independence of the latter confession from prior misconduct.

Also, while evidence derived from technical Miranda violations need not be excluded, intentionally withholding the warnings to elicit an initial confession, then giving the warnings in an attempt to legitimize a subsequent repetition of the admission, is likely to result in the warnings being seen as ineffective under the circumstances so that the later confession will also be seen as involuntary and still be inadmissible.52 The average suspect is unlikely to appreciate the legal distinction between the two confessions, making him unable to knowingly waive his Miranda rights.

1. Good Faith Exception

When police investigate with the objectively reasonable, good faith belief that their actions are in compliance with legal requirements, the deterrence value of excluding evidence is seen to be low, and the evidence gained will be admissible. Thus, when a police officer acts in reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by an independent magistrate that is later found to be invalid as unsupported by probable cause, exclusion is unlikely to change police behavior in any way.53 The officer is already attempting to comply with the Fourth Amendment’s requirements. Reliance on a warrant would not be objectively reasonable, however, when the warrant was based on misrepresentations (or reckless statements) by law enforcement, when the magistrate had clearly abandoned his independent judicial role, when a warrant was facially deficient, or when the affidavit in support of the warrant was entirely lacking in support for a finding of probable cause. 54

Similarly, police reliance on a statute which is later found to be unconstitutional to execute an administrative search will not lead to exclusion.55 The deterrence value is too low in this situation to justify the costs of exclusion, as police cannot be expected to constantly question the constitutionality of the    laws they enforce. Deterrence value is also low when the police rely on a court clerk’s erroneous assurance that a warrant exists in making an arrest. The violation results from the clerk’s mistake, not police indifference to the violation, and because clerk’s have no investment in the criminal trial’s outcome, they will not be deterred by its outcome.56

In a recent case, evidence has even been allowed when it was gathered in reliance on a mistake made by other police officers. 57 When other police officers mistakenly informed a neighboring county’s police force that an outstanding warrant existed, and a subsequent search discovered illegal drugs and weapons, the Court found the deterrence of excluding this evidence to be at a minimum. The poor recordkeeping that led to the mistake was merely negligent, not part of a pattern of misconduct, and done by a police force distant from the existing case and investigating officers. The investigating police’s conduct was not sufficiently culpable to merit exclusion, so exclusion was unlikely to deter this kind of mistake. The court has previously rejected requirements of bad faith for exclusion as needing too much speculation into the mental states of police officers, but it is unclear if requiring a mental state beyond negligence will result in just that.

2. The Independent Source Exception

 Even that a fact was gained by exploitation of a culpable constitutional violation does not mean that it can never be used at court. If it can be shown that the fact can be proved by reliance on an “independent source” entirely unconnected with the violation, then it can be introduced as any other evidence.58 The classic example involves the exclusion of finger prints taken from a robbery suspect when he had been arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The government was allowed to admit an earlier set of fingerprints taken before the illegal arrest (in an unrelated matter), because they were not derived from exploitation of the unlawful arrest. 59 There is no reason to exclude evidence wholly unrelated to the constitutional violation just because the illegal practice uncovered the same evidence.

Later cases have considered exactly how separate from the violation an “independent” source must be for evidence to be admissible under this doctrine. In Segura v. United States, police illegally entered a location without a warrant, and remained present to secure the premises while other officers obtained a search warrant based on information known before the illegal entry.60  At trial, the defendant sought to exclude evidence which was not discovered or seen during the earlier, illegal entry, but was discovered in a second search conducted under the valid warrant. The Court held that although the police’s illegal presence between searches might have protected evidence from destruction until the legal search occurred, the search under the warrant was still an independent lawful source, distinct from the constitutional violation.

In Murray v. United States, police who had the requisite probable cause to obtain a search warrant, illegally entered a site without a warrant anyway, and discovered the contraband they had suspected would be present.61 Leaving the scene untouched, they then acquired a search warrant to seize the contraband, based entirely on information known before the illegal entry and with no mention of the illegal entry. They then executed the warrant and seized the contraband they knew would be there. The Court held that the seized evidence was admissible, so long as the search under the warrant was also not motivated by information learned during the illegal search. In this case, the decision to get a warrant and conduct a legal search was seen to be independent from and not motivated by the illegal search.

1. The Inevitable Discovery Exception-

 A separate exception allows the admission of tainted evidence that would “inevitably” have been discovered by police in the absence of an established constitutional violation. Where the ‘independent source’ exception considers whether police also acquired evidence from an untainted source despite illegal behavior, the ‘inevitable discovery’ exception asks what might have happened in the absence of any illegal behavior. If the prosecution can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would have been discovered by lawful means (had no misconduct occurred removing it), then the evidence is outside of the exclusionary rule. This exception is also based on the deterrence rationale, in that deterrence is achieved by relieving police of any undue benefit resulting from impermissible procedures. To exclude evidence which would ultimately have been lawfully discovered anyway, would put police in a worse position than they were in before the unlawful conduct, which is more than the rule requires and a higher cost than can be reasonably born.62

To avoid the ‘inevitable discovery’ exception becoming so large as to devour the rule, and to focus the inquiry only on “historical facts capable of ready verification” rather than mere hypotheticals, 63 some lower courts have required that an investigation which would lawfully discover the evidence already be in progress when the illegal conduct occurred.64  This rule fits the facts of the seminal case of Nix v. Williams where an unconstitutionally obtained confession led to the discovery of a murder victim’s body which would soon have been discovered by search efforts in the area.65

A recent Supreme Court case however, has relied in part on what appears to be a more expansive version of the exception. In Hudson v. Michigan66, police executing a valid search warrant failed to properly knock and announce their presence before forcibly entering a home. In allowing the admission of drugs seized within the home, the Court found that the contraband would have been discovered anyway. If the police had not failed to properly announce, the warrant could have been lawfully executed. The opinion has been understandably controversial, and it is still unclear the impact it will have in other contexts.

3. Use Outside the Criminal Setting

 The Court has also found that the deterrence value of exclusion is low when evidence is used in forums other than criminal trials. For example, an indictment by a grand jury cannot be challenged on the basis that evidence introduced was unconstitutionally acquired,67 nor can a witness at a grand jury hearing refuse to answer questions concerning evidence premised on an illegal search.68 The ensuing criminal trial is seen as affording ample opportunity for an indicted defendant to challenge evidence, and this is sufficient to deter police misconduct.69 The deterrence value of exclusion at parole hearings is also seen as insufficient to overcome evidentiary costs, because police are generally more concerned with gathering

evidence for use at criminal trials, subject to the rule, than to such administrative hearings and will

therefore not be additionally deterred by the exclusion.70 Parole officers, who might be more invested in a given hearing, are sufficiently deterred from illegality by the threat of disciplinary hearings and damages actions.71 Deterrence at deportation hearings is also seen as too low to justify exclusion despite the direct incentive for immigration officers to violate rights in gaining evidence to press their case. This is in part because asking the court to ignore evidence of an ongoing crime (illegal presence), unacceptably increases the cost of the rule. 72 Finally, exclusion is also inapplicable to a civil tax proceeding, despite its quasi-criminal nature, based on the broader belief that exclusion at criminal court is generally sufficient deterrent to modify police behavior without further expansion of the rule. 73

1. Use at Criminal Trial for a Purpose other than Conviction (Impeachment)-

 The Court has also found that evidence banned from use in the government’s case-in-chief may still be admissible for collateral purposes such as impeachment. Testimony excluded from a previous trial could thus be used in a later, unrelated trial to contradict the defendant’s testimony, if considered only as to the issue of the defendant’s credibility.74  The Court has reasoned that a criminal should not be able to use the exclusionary rule as a shield which allows him to securely perjure himself.

Even evidence more directly related to the crime at trial, or gathered in the same investigation, may be admissible for this purpose when the defendant perjures himself.75 A defendant must be able to refute the elements of the instant crime without opening the door to admission of illegally acquired evidence, but such evidence can permissibly be used to refute defendant’s affirmative use of untruths.76 If the government wishes to use illegally acquired evidence to impeach testimony offered in response to its own cross-examination questions, however, the questions must have been reasonably suggested by direct examination testimony, and not merely a vehicle to for opening the door to the banned evidence.77

Generally, impeachment use is permissible regardless of whether the evidence was initially banned as the result of a Miranda violation or a Fourth Amendment search or seizure. 78 The danger that investigators would use illegal practices for the limited purpose of gathering impeachment evidence is slight and the deterrent value of the Fourth Amendment or Miranda rules is not strongly compromised by such use.79 When the proposed impeachment evidence is an involuntary confession, however, and not just a Miranda violation, the confession may still be excluded because of its inherent untrustworthiness and the Fifth Amendment’s direct proscription against coerced testimony. 80 Statements gathered in violation of the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, are not necessarily compelled, and if proven voluntary might be admissible for the purpose of impeachment.81

Where the government seeks to use unlawfully acquired evidence to impeach someone other than the defendant, they will generally not be allowed. The Court has found that while this would have little benefit to truth-seeking on the primary issues of the case, it would open the door very wide for the admission of otherwise banned evidence.82 The deterrence value of the exclusionary rule would be reduced as police learned that excluded evidence could often be admissible for other purposes, and at the same time, defendants themselves might be deterred from presenting witnesses in their defense out of fear that an impeachment opportunity might arise.

1. Standing

Standing refers to the constitutional requirement that government action can be challenged as unconstitutional only by those with a sufficient interest in the challenged action.83 In the context of the exclusionary rule, only a person who has suffered an injury to his personal rights can challenge evidence arising from it.84 This means that there is no standing to challenge evidence gathered in violation of a third party’s rights. This may be true even when the unlawful conduct was targeted to gain evidence for use against the defendant. 85

Since the Court clarified that standing is established only when the defendant proves that he has personally suffered a constitutional violation, the standing inquiry is really one and the same as the consideration of whether there has been a relevant constitutional violation.86 The standing issue becomes critical, however, in the prosecution of those who worked with criminal confederates. While a court might hold that all the evidence in a case was illegally gathered, it is possible that no one defendant will have standing to challenge all the searches at his trial. Suspect B then, might not have standing to challenge an incriminatory involuntary confession taken from suspect A, so that A’s confession would be admissible at B’s trial.

In the case of Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations, it is always clear whose personal rights have been violated. The nature of the injury, compelled testimony or lack of counsel, makes it clear who the aggrieved party is. In the case of a Fourth Amendment search or seizure violation, however, it can be more difficult to determine whose rights were violated by a given search or seizure. More than one person’s rights might be violated in the course of a single search. In this setting, the Supreme Court requires a showing that the evidence was gathered in violation of the defendant’s own legitimate expectation of privacy as to the location searched.87 Because the Court has found that an expectation of

privacy is legitimate if society recognizes it as reasonable,88 the inquiry is always very fact specific to the person and premises. This standard is a constitutionally required minimum, but states are welcome to extend standing more widely. New Jersey for example, allows challenges by all parties with even a ‘participatory interest’ in seized property. 89

Legitimate expectations of privacy (and thus standing to challenge government searches and seizures) fall into three broad interest types: (1) Possessory interest in the premises searched, (2) Legitimate presence at the site during the search, (3) Possessory interests in the items seized. Having such an interest in property or a location is not a guarantee of absolute privacy, however, and the nature of the interest shapes what privacy might be expected. A casual passenger in a friend’s car, for example, could not be said to have an expectation of privacy in the contents of the car’s glove compartment (which casual passengers rarely access) though they might have such an expectation as to the cabin area. 90

The owner or lessee of a house has an expectation of privacy in that location. This is true even if he is not present when a search is conducted. 91 The use of the area need not be exclusive, so defendants are considered to have a privacy interest in hotel rooms,92 and common office space as well.93 When possession is shared, there cannot be a privacy interest in areas that are under the exclusive dominion of another person such as the private bedrooms of housemates. 94

Persons legitimately on site at the time of a search also have some privacy expectations as to the premises. Most famously, this includes overnight house guests who expect that while hosts might admit others, they will generally act to safeguard the privacy of their guests.95More casual social guests, who are not staying overnight, might not reasonably enjoy such privacy expectations, depending on the duration

and nature of their visit and their relationship with the household. 96  Privacy expectations based on presence at commercial premises or for commercial purposes are less than the expectation for social calls to a residence.97

Ownership of seized property is not alone sufficient to create a protected privacy interest in that property. 98 The location of the search must also always be considered in determining whether the defendant has standing to challenge a seizure. If the accused quickly stashed his drug contraband into a casual acquaintance’s bags, for example, he would not have standing to object to the search of the bag and seizure of the drugs.99 To show standing, he would need to prove that he had free access to the bags or the right to exclude others from the bags. Similarly, letters once mailed, may no longer afford the sender any expectation of privacy as it is expected they will become the recipients’ property and out of the sender’s control.100

III.   How the Exclusionary Rule is Invoked: Procedural Considerations

While much of the exclusionary rule’s substance is determined by the Constitution and thus standardized across the entire nation, the procedure for raising objections to evidence varies considerably from state to state and in the federal courts. The Constitution mandates some procedural requirements as well, but the states have become active laboratories for experimenting with different procedural policies. Different choices as to the timing of objections and standards of proof required reflect different priorities in the delicate balance between judicial efficiency, protection of defendants’ rights and police power.

1. Motions to Suppress

1. Timing

When the government seeks to introduce evidence into trial which the defendant believes to be unlawfully obtained, the issue of exclusion is raised by defendant’s motion to suppress. 101 In the federal court system this must be a pretrial motion, and a failure to raise the issue before trial will be considered a waiver of the issue absent special justification. 102  This keeps the trial focused on the single issue of guilt, and encourages the parties to reach a plea agreement by arming them with a full understanding of what evidence will be available at trial.

If the defendant raises the issue of exclusion only at trial, federal courts have discretion as to whether to hear the motion. This allowance benefits those defendants who couldn’t have known that there were grounds for excluding the evidence until trial. Once the court elects not to hear a motion made at trial, the defendant may challenge the denial on appeal but must show that the court abused its discretion in the denial and that substantial prejudice resulted. The availability and timing of appeals is discussed further below.

While many states follow the federal rules, there is some variation in state laws as to when a motion to suppress must be made. There are state laws that are more lax than the federal rules, requiring only that the objection be made before, or simultaneously with, the government’s offering of the challenged evidence.103 There are also those, however, that limit judicial discretion by putting strict time

limits on how many days before trial the motion must be filed.104 Some states have even drafted statutory

exceptions to timeliness requirements, going so far as to identify specific situations in which a motion made only at trial must be heard or enumerating factors to be considered in deciding whether to consider a late motion.105 These timing changes reflect the need to balance judicial resources, be fair to the parties, and fully hear the important constitutional issue.

1. Showing and Burden

The Federal Rules require that a motion to suppress be particular in stating the relief sought and the reasons why it should be granted. The motion must clearly identify what evidence is being challenged and the legal grounds on which it should be excluded. This means that the motion should assert a specific legal theory for exclusion, such as seizure without a warrant, and in most jurisdictions, should specifically allege facts which support this theory. The facts presented, if taken as truth, must require exclusion. These proofs may be made through attached sworn affidavits. While all information included with the motion must be definite and non-conjectural so that a court can conclude that a hearing is warranted, affidavits based solely on “information and belief” are acceptable so long as they provide sources and basis for these beliefs.

A sufficient motion to suppress will initiate a suppression hearing. This is almost always a pre- trial hearing as the defendant must know in advance what evidence will be presented against him at trial in order to formulate his defense, decide whether he will testify, and consider entering a guilty plea.

Federal judges may refer the suppression hearing to a magistrate, but must personally make the final determination as to exclusion, and hold a second hearing if they wish to reverse the magistrate’s recommendations. The limited scope of the hearing also allows for a relaxation of the rules of evidence, and the judge has increased discretion to permit all relevant evidence, even that which is impermissible under normal evidentiary rules.106

The Supreme Court has recognized that an accused challenging evidence must be free to testify without fear that testimony provided in support of the challenge will later be used against him on the issue of guilt. 107If the government were allowed to use such testimony against the defendant at trial, it would substantially discourage such challenges, and leave the constitutional issues un-litigated. Consider the difficult dilemma that would otherwise face a person accused of drug possession who hopes challenge the

admission of illegally seized contraband into evidence: to assert standing, he would need to allege an interest in the contraband, but to do so would mean admitting the key element of the crime. Similarly, the prosecution cannot use the evidentiary hearing as a chance to cross-exam the defendant on unrelated issues in the hopes of gathering more evidence.108 The defendant’s testimony, however, may still be

admissible at trial for impeachment purposes.109

Burden of proof

Generally, the burden as to the issues of standing and of the existence of a constitutional violation are on the defendant, as the party seeking exclusion, and satisfied by a sufficient motion to suppress. The assignment of the burden for other issues, however, varies depending on the nature of the alleged violation, and in turn the grounds for exclusion. That a confession was voluntary, 110 given after a

knowing waiver of Miranda rights,111 or that a defendant waived his right to counsel, for example, must

always be proven by the prosecution if challenged. Undue bias in an identification procedure, however, usually must be proven by the defense. States reserve the right to place the burdens on the prosecution in all issues. 112

In the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context, the allocation of the burden depends on whether police acted with or without a warrant. If the police searched without a warrant, then the prosecution bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the search or seizure was lawful under an exception to the general warrant requirement.113 If the government argues that the search

was consented to, it also bears the burden of proving consent. 114 Searches made under the authority of a

warrant are presumed to be lawful. The warrant, issued by a magistrate, is a testament to the fact that police have already made a showing of probable cause to an impartial tribunal. As a result, once the warrant is presented, the defendant bears the difficult burden of proving that the warrant is invalid or did not cover the search, and that the search was unconstitutional. Should the defendant succeed in making his proofs, the character of the hearing again resembles that in which police acted without a warrant. The burden is again on the prosecution to show that the search was permissible. If the government seeks to admit evidence despite a constitutional violation under the independent source or inevitable discovery exceptions, the burdens of production and persuasion will both rest with the prosecution to show that the exception applies. 115

Standard of Proof

As discussed above, the preponderance of the evidence standard is generally the standard the government must meet to defeat a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence when the motion concerns the voluntariness of a confession116, a waiver of Miranda rights117, consent to a warrantless search118, or evidence under the inevitable discovery exception. 119 While this standard satisfies Constitutional requirements, states are still able to impose higher standards if they so choose.120 The standard of proof required of the defendant as to searches conducted under a warrant and bias in an identification procedure is less often directly discussed, but is generally also met by the preponderance standard.121 Defendant’s claims that police perjured themselves, or were reckless as to the truth, in obtaining a search warrant must meet this standard as well. 122

Franks Hearing

Usually, a defendant may only challenge the validity of a search under the warrant as written, but a defendant may also contest the validity of a police search warrant based on misrepresentations in gaining the warrant. In Franks v. Delaware123 the Court held that the Fourth Amendment requires that a

hearing be held on this issue, now commonly referred to as a “Franks Hearing.” To initiate such a hearing, the defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that the warrant was critically based on either deliberately false statements or statements made with a reckless disregard as to their truth. If at the hearing, the defendant can prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, and the remaining basis         for the warrant is insufficient to support probable cause, the warrant will be voided, and evidence tainted  by the search excluded. Some courts have held that deliberate omissions meant to mislead or made with reckless disregard for the truth can also be the basis for a Franks hearing. 124

Appeal

Once the court has decided on the defendant’s motion to suppress, the federal rules, and some states, allow for an immediate interlocutory appeal on the issue by the government only. 125 Other states however allow such appeals by either party, or by neither party absent a showing of new evidence being available.126 After trial, a convicted defendant, who has not waived the suppression issue, can seek review. In considering such appeals, some state courts will consider only the evidence present during the suppression hearing, but the federal rules permit the appellate court to consider trial evidence as well. 127

The review of a denial of a motion to suppress is generally considered in the light most favorable to the government.128 The denial will only be reversed if it shown to be completely erroneous, or not

supported by substantial evidence on the record.129 The decision is one of both law and fact, and the appellate court defers to the trial courts assessment factual issues remanding if the record is incomplete.130 The legal issues, however, are subject to de novo review during the appeal.131

Even if the denial of suppression is found on appeal to have been error, the conviction will not be overturned if the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, but was only harmless error. A reversal will only occur when there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.132 The government bears the heavy burden of showing that the error was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.133 In considering whether there was harmless error, courts will

consider the degree to which the challenged evidence impacted the jury and thus the verdict and the existence of other evidence presented on the same issue. If there was overwhelming additional evidence of guilt presented at trial, the admission was likely harmless error.134

Traditionally, a defendant who pleads guilty also waives his right to challenge the constitutionality of evidence. As the conviction is based upon the plea, not the evidence, there is no reason to permit collateral challenges to the conviction on the grounds of illegal police investigatory practice.  Some states and federal courts however have recognized that this forces a defendant who has lost             a suppression motion to go to trial in order to avoid losing his right to appeal the suppression issue. At   the state level, one solution to this problem is statutory authorization preserving such appeals. State and federal courts are split as to whether the court may authorize an agreement between government and defendant which states that the defendant will plead guilty but expressly reserve the right to challenge the evidentiary issue.

1 Drafted by Jeremy Daum and commented and revised by New York University School of Law, U.S. – Asia Law

Institute team 2009



2 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 497‐99 (1971). (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)

3 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437‐444 (2000). 4 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639‐40 (2004)

5 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).

6 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (2004.)

7 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

8 Massiah at 206

9 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1951) 10 Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977)    11 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)

12 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)

13 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)

14 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) 15 Id. at 492

16 Corley v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1558,(2009).

17 Ibid.

18 Marbury v.Madison, 5. U.S. 137 (1803)

19 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833(1992

20 Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 700 (2009). 21 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

22 Herring, 129 S.Ct at 700 (2009).

23 Id.

24 See e.g. Wayne LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure S 1.2, at 25‐27 (3rd. edition 1996). 25 See e.g. Donald Dripps, Living with Leon,  95 Yale L.J. 906, 919(1986).

26 See e.g. Report of the Comptroller Gen., Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions, Rep.

CDG‐79‐75 (1979)

27 See e.g. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 44

(1994)

28 See Bradley C. Cannon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea against a

Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 708‐811 (1974).

29 See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1365 (2008) 3

0 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to do About It, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037 (1996) 31 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)

32 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597‐99 (2006)

33 Id. at 599, Citing S. Walker, Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950‐1990 51 (1993)

34 Wong Sun V.v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484‐86 (1963)

35Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601 (1975)

36 United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978)

37 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939)

38 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391‐92 (1920) 39 Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341

40 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239‐40 (1967) 41 406 U.S. 441, 449‐51(1972)

42 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004)

43 Wong Su, , 371 U.S. at 91 44 Brown, 422 U.S. at 603    45 Id. at 603

46 New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990) 47 Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277

49 United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 541‐42(1947)

50 See e.g. Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349(1968) 51 Brown, 422 U.S. at 605

52 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 612‐14 (2004)

53 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897， 916‐17  (1984)

54 Id. at 914‐915

55 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987)

56 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14(1995)

57 Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 703(2009)

58 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, , 251 U.S. 385, 392(1920)

59 United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 467 (1990) citing Bynum v. United States, 274 f.d2 767 (D.C.Cir.1960)

60 468 U.S. 796 (1984)

61 Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)

62 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)

63 Id. at 444 n. 5

64 See United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 580 (5th Cir, 2008) 65 Nix, 467 U.S. 431

66 547 U.S. 586, 600 (2006)

67 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 408 (1956)

68 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349‐352 (1974)

69 United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966)

70 Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) 71 Id. at 368

72 INS v. Lopez‐Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984)

73 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) 74 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1957) 75 Harris v. New York,401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)

76 Walder, 347 U.S. at 65

77 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 631(1980) 78 See e.g., Harris, 401 U.S. 222

79 Id. at 225

80 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397‐402 (1978) 81 Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, (1990)

82 James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314 (1990)

83 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204‐08 (1962)

84 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133‐135 (1978)

85 Id. At 136-37

86 Id. at 140    87 Id. at 143

88 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 (1990)

89 State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 547 (NJ S.Ct. 2008)

90 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148‐49

91 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969)

92 See e.g. Stoner v. State of California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) 93 See e.g. Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)

94 See e.g. Northern v. United States, 455 F.2d 427, 430 (C.A.9 1972) 95 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990)

96 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89‐90 (1998) 97 Id. at 90

98 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) 99 Id.

100 United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1996 (6th Cir. 1995)

2 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 497‐99 (1971). (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)

3 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437‐444 (2000). 4 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639‐40 (2004)

5 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).

6 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (2004.)

7 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

8 Massiah at 206

9 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1951) 10 Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977)    11 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)

12 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)

13 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)

14 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) 15 Id. at 492

16 Corley v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1558,(2009).

17 Ibid.

18 Marbury v.Madison, 5. U.S. 137 (1803)

19 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833(1992

20 Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 700 (2009). 21 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

22 Herring, 129 S.Ct at 700 (2009).

23 Id.

24 See e.g. Wayne LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure S 1.2, at 25‐27 (3rd. edition 1996). 25 See e.g. Donald Dripps, Living with Leon,  95 Yale L.J. 906, 919(1986).

26 See e.g. Report of the Comptroller Gen., Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions, Rep.

CDG‐79‐75 (1979)

27 See e.g. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 44

(1994)

28 See Bradley C. Cannon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea against a

Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 708‐811 (1974).

29 See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1365 (2008) 3

0 See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to do About It, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037 (1996) 31 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)

32 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597‐99 (2006)

33 Id. at 599, Citing S. Walker, Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950‐1990 51 (1993)

34 Wong Sun V.v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484‐86 (1963)

35Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601 (1975)

36 United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978)

37 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939)

38 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391‐92 (1920) 39 Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341

40 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239‐40 (1967) 41 406 U.S. 441, 449‐51(1972)

42 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004)

43 Wong Su, , 371 U.S. at 91 44 Brown, 422 U.S. at 603    45 Id. at 603

46 New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990) 47 Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277

49 United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 541‐42(1947)

50 See e.g. Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349(1968) 51 Brown, 422 U.S. at 605

52 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 612‐14 (2004)

53 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897， 916‐17  (1984)

54 Id. at 914‐915

55 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987)

56 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14(1995)

57 Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 703(2009)

58 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, , 251 U.S. 385, 392(1920)

59 United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 467 (1990) citing Bynum v. United States, 274 f.d2 767 (D.C.Cir.1960)

60 468 U.S. 796 (1984)

61 Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)

62 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)

63 Id. at 444 n. 5

64 See United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 580 (5th Cir, 2008) 65 Nix, 467 U.S. 431

66 547 U.S. 586, 600 (2006)

67 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 408 (1956)

68 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349‐352 (1974)

69 United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966)

70 Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998) 71 Id. at 368

72 INS v. Lopez‐Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984)

73 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 448, 454 (1976) 74 Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1957) 75 Harris v. New York,401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)

76 Walder, 347 U.S. at 65

77 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 631(1980) 78 See e.g., Harris, 401 U.S. 222

79 Id. at 225

80 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397‐402 (1978) 81 Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, (1990)

82 James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314 (1990)

83 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204‐08 (1962)

84 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133‐135 (1978)

85 Id. At 136-37

86 Id. at 140    87 Id. at 143

88 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 (1990)

89 State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 547 (NJ S.Ct. 2008)

90 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148‐49

91 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969)

92 See e.g. Stoner v. State of California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) 93 See e.g. Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)

94 See e.g. Northern v. United States, 455 F.2d 427, 430 (C.A.9 1972) 95 Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990)

96 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89‐90 (1998) 97 Id. at 90

98 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) 99 Id.

100 United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1996 (6th Cir. 1995)

101 Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h)

102 Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e)

103 See e.g. Nelson v. State, 626 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)

104 See e.g. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §255.20(1) (must be filed within 45 days of arraignment)

105 See e.g. Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(h). (motion made at trial because defendant was unaware of grounds pre‐trial,

motion must be entertained)

106 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, (1994); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 104(a). 107 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390‐91 (1968).

108 Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 104(d).

109 United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 110 Lego v. Twomey  404 U.S. 477 (1972)

111 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

112 Ariz. Rules Crim. Proc §16.2(b)‐ placing the burden on the prosecution) 113 U.S. v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1971)

114 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)

115 See e.g. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 116 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482‐89 (1972).

117  Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).

118 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14 (1974) 119 Nix v. Williams 467 U.S. 431, 444

120 Lego v Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489.

121   See United States v. Guerrero‐Barajas, 240 F.3d 428, 432 (5th Cir. Tex. 2001) (requiring preponderance of the evidence to prove a constitutional violation); Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure,

• 10.4(d)(3rd edition 2000).

122 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (U.S. 1978)

123 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

124 See e.g. United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1986) 125 18 U.S.C. §§3731,2518(10)(b).

126 Cal. Penal Code §1583.5(j)(allowing appeals by either party)); Pa. R. Crim. P. 581(J)(forbidding appeals by either

party unless new evidence is discovered).

127 See e.g. U.S. v. Alvarez‐Becerra, 33 Fed.Appx. 403 (10th Cir. 2002)(trial evidence accepted); State v. Gora, 148

N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1977)(trial evidence barred at appeal).

128 United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 49 (2nd Cir. 1977).

129 United States v. Patterson ,292 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2002); United States vs. Jobin, 535 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1976)

130   Patterson (2002)

131 United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 1976) 132 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)

133 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1972)

134 United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690 (11th Cir. 2002)

摘要：非法证据排 除规则是一种以司法方式创设而成的救济措施，旨在阻止政府在审判时使用以侵害被告人宪法性权利的方式而取得的证据。该规则来源于美国宪法第四修正案禁止非法搜查与扣押的规定，但也同样适用于违反美国宪法第五修正案、第六修正案和第十四修正案规定的情形之中。当该规则违反第四修正案的规定时，其主要目的是阻却警察未来的违法行为。美国联邦最高法院还设立了数个该规则适用的例外，当排除非法证据对警察的违法行为阻却价值达到最小化时，这种以不正当手段获取的证据可以有限度地被使用。本背景材料介绍了非法证据排除规则的原理与依据、适用例外以及其在审判中的实施情况。

一、非法证据排除规则的原理、依据及其历史

非法证据排除规则是法院创设一种 救济 措施，旨在阻止政府在案件诉讼过程中，特别是在审判阶段使用以侵害被告人宪法权利的方式而取得的证据。被排除的证据不仅包括警察发现的实物证据，还包括证人证言和被告人的供述。在通常情况下，非法证据排除规则的应用多与违反美国宪法第四修正案禁止非法搜查和扣押规定而取得的证据相关，但是美国联邦最高法院认为违反宪法第五修正案、第六修正案和宪法所规定的正当程序而取得的证据也应当被排除。虽然不同的宪法条款有关排除非法证据的理由各异，但是许多共同问题的存在还是使得我们可以从整体上对该规则进行探讨。与此同时，应当注意到排除非法证据的宪法性依据的不同在有些时候确实会影响被排除证据的范围。因此，正确理解上述每个宪法修正案为何要排除非法证据以及不同的宪法规定如何影响非法证据排除规则的适用是十分重要的。

1、排除非法证据的依据

美国宪法第五修正案规定：“任何人不得于任何刑事案件中被强迫自证其罪。”联邦最高法院认为由于宪法第五修正案直接表明禁止该种证据的使用，因而该修正案自然而然地需要一个自己的证据排除规则作为其被违反时的救济措施。[1]当供述是以强迫被告人自证其罪的方式而被获取时，即意味着被告人是在非自愿的情况下认罪，第五修正案禁止这种供述在审判中被使用。众所周知的“米兰达规则”要求警察在讯问前告知受指控的人有获得律师帮助以及不自我归罪的权利，该规则同样来源于宪法第五修正案。如果警察没有进行上述通知，或者没有给予被告人上述权利，那么将会导致未来在法庭上该非法证据被排除。[2]米兰达警告被认为是一项预防违反第五修正案行为发生的措施，如果警察没有作出这种警告，或者没有尊重米兰达规则所赋予被告人的权利，则可以推定被告人的供述是被强迫作出的并且不具可采性。^[3]

美国宪法第六修正案赋予了被告人与对自己不利的证人对质的权利以及在刑事诉讼所有关键性环节中获得律师帮助的权利。律师在场提供帮助对于被告人自我辩护的有效性而言至关重要，因此，律师的不在场（除了在自愿和知情的情况下放弃律师帮助权）很可能导致某些证据在审判中被排除。这即意味着在被告人开始享有律师帮助权（追诉被告人的诉讼程序因正式指控、预审、起诉、罪状认否程序而启动之时或之后[4]）和被告人要求获得律师帮助之后，警察故意引诱被告人作出供述的行为将会导致该供述具有被排除的风险。[5]当被告人参加任何辨认程序时，律师应该接到事前通知并且在场，这样可以防止违法现象的发生，并且可以为在审判过程中质询辨认证人做好准备。[6]联邦最高法院认为应将排除非法证据作为政府干扰律师与当事人职业特权关系的救济措施，理由有二：第一，在这种案件中，审判中使用以上述不当手段获得的对被告人不利的证据是违反宪法的，因而排除这些证据便可以阻止损害的蔓延；[7]第二，与因违反宪法第四修正案而适用非法证据排除规则的理由相似，对警察不当行为的惩罚可以阻却其将来继续实施违法行为。[8]

警察的某些行为会被视为直接侵害了宪法第十四修正案规定的被告人所享有的正当程序权利。例如警察某些做法导致获取的证据相当不可靠时，比如：一个辨认程序所得出的结论明显具有倾向性时。[9]这种证据会在审判中引起不合理的偏见，因而应该被排除。正当程序条款同时也要求排除警察以“严重违反文明制度、必须加以取缔的方式”取得的证据，例如：刑讯逼供。[10]排除这种证据的理由与违反宪法第四修正案而排除非法证据的理由相似，即阻却警察的恶劣行为。[11]

违反宪法第四修正案的排除规则（最经常被认为是“非法证据排除规则”）是一种以司法方式创设的旨在阻却警察违法搜查和扣押行为的救济措施。与非法证据排除规则的范围和适用方法相关的法律来源于宪法第四修正案，随后适用于其他违宪行为之中。第四修正案要求搜查行为必须是合理的，即从总体上要求警察必须具有搜查的合理根据，同时取得载明具体搜查地点和目标的搜查证，在执行搜查时必须向被搜查者表明其正在搜查。联邦最高法院指出在审判中使用对被告人不利的非法扣押的证据将导致宪法第四修正案变得一纸空文，因此如果要使该修正案具有效力，就必须排除这种非法证据。[12]人们曾经相信非法证据排除规则的应用可以使法院排除以不当方式取得的证据，从而保持其正当性和可信度；现在人们普遍认为非法证据排除规则的主要作用是消除人们违反宪法规定的动机。[13]非法取证的违宪行为会导致重要的证据不能在审判中使用，否定警察的侦查行为则意味着阻止其继续实施违宪行为。这种阻却价值并不特别针对某一案件或警察权力，而是通过在较长时间内由法院再三强调这种违宪行为的严重性以及使得警察将尊重宪法第四修正案置于重要位置来实现的。[14]

需要指出的是，排除证据有时也是针对某些非违宪性不法行为的救济措施。一个典型的例子就是迈克纳布—马洛里（McNabb-Mallory）规则，即被逮捕的犯罪嫌疑人在没有被迅速带见治安法官进行预审前所作出的供述应被排除。此处排除证据的依据是联邦成文法所规定的禁止秘密羁押和应当告知犯罪嫌疑人被控罪名的“迅速带见法官规则”。[15]尽管该项立法仅仅要求被逮捕的犯罪嫌疑人应当不被不合理拖延地带至治安法官处，并未明确表示违反该规定所收集的证据应被排除，但是联邦最高法院认为如果这种违法取得的证据被允许成为判处被告有罪的依据，那么将导致该项法律被规避。对此，美国议会通过创设“安全港”条款对法院适用非法证据排除规则进行了限制：犯罪嫌疑人在被逮捕后的六个小时内，可以不被带见治安法官，在这段时间内向警察做出的具有可采性的自白不会仅仅因为没有带见法官就被排除。[16]

2、非法证据排除规则的历史发展

享有权利即意味着同时拥有权利被侵害时的救济措施，然而美国宪法却并未就侵犯《权利法案》基础条款的救济措施作出规定。前述各项宪法修正案都仅以最宽泛的方式规定了刑事侦查程序和被告人在审判中所享有的权利。不过，美国联邦最高法院对这些宪法条款的解释则阐明了其内涵外延，使其实施机制变得逐渐清晰。

美国法院通过行使司法审查权解释宪法并且判断其他政府部门行为的合宪性。[17]虽然违宪审查并未在宪法中被明文规定，但其对立法和行政部门的审查已经被认为是确保所有法律和政府行为符合宪法的必要措施。联邦法院和州法院都享有违宪审查权，联邦最高法院是判断法律、当地政府行为、州政府行为、联邦政府行为是否与宪法抵触的最高司法机关。联邦最高法院已经意识到推翻宪法判例的艰难性以及保持国家最高位阶法律稳定、不受政治气候变化影响的必要性，因而在行使违宪审查权时十分谨慎。[18]毕竟宪法性规则在美国具有最高效力，只能因法院行为而非立法行为改变。因此，联邦最高法院只在确有争议的情况下和在其处理的案件中考虑合宪性问题，既不会给出与合宪性有关的咨询意见，也不会在假设的情形中去质疑法律的合宪性。

在厄尔·沃伦担任首席大法官期间（1953年——1969年），美国联邦最高法院对宪法作出了大量的自由派解释。这一趋势在刑事诉讼领域尤为突出，由于联邦最高法院针对政府的侦查追诉行为给予了个人许多新的宪法性保护措施，因而人们通常认为这是一个“革命”性时期。联邦最高法院认为这些宪法性权利不仅可以对抗联邦政府的行为，同时也应该适用于进行绝大多数法律实施活动的州政府。虽然有人批评当时的联邦最高法院以牺牲有效的警察权力为代价来保护有罪的被告人，但是现在很难想象如果没有其当时创设而今被认为是理所应当的宪法性保护措施，美国的法律将会是什么样子。这些保护措施包括：为被告人提供免费的、独立的律师帮助，要求警察在讯问期间告知犯罪嫌疑人享有沉默权，在各州适用非法证据排除规则。

在经历了前述变革时期之后，联邦最高法院其后的判决显示出其愈发不愿自动适用非法证据排除规则。现在的联邦最高法院认为排除证据并非违宪行为的必然后果，而是针对被告人的最后一项救济措施。[19]在沃伦大法官执掌联邦最高法院期间，法院认为非法证据排除规则是宪法第四修正案的重要组成部分，[20]然而现在的联邦最高法院认为这只不过是一项以司法方式创设而成的救济措施。[21]在过去三十年间，法院创设了一系列非法证据排除规则的例外，使得以前虽然有可信度但依规则理应被排除的证据现得以在审判中使用，并且缩小了该规则的适用范围。如此一来，联邦最高法院仅仅关注该规则对政府不法行为的阻却作用，当使用该规则的成本大于其阻却作用时，便拒绝使用这一规则。[22]非法证据排除规则的成本包括忽略具有现实可信度的证据，甚至有时无罪释放明显有罪和具有潜在危险性的罪犯。法院在审判中较为容易判断如果适用非法证据排除规则需要付出的那些具体成本，而很难判付出代价后是否会对阻却警察未来行为有作用，因为这种阻却作用大小常常依赖于一种猜测。尽管如此，排除非法证据仍然是刑事诉讼中控辩双方经常争议的一个焦点。

3、关于非法证据排除规则的争论

由于强调排除非法证据的阻却作用，因而人们把成本——收益分析作为非法证据排除规则争论的重心，并且批评指出为了排除证据而置案件事实于不顾的做法是不合理的。非法证据排除规则的支持者则认为是宪法自身而非排除证据救济措施导致在使用该规则时产生了“成本”。无论是通过排除非法证据，还是直接阻止警察非法取证，有效贯彻宪法对警察行为限制任何措施都会导致证据的某种损耗。[23]非法证据排除规则的反对者则认为该规则所排除证据的范围大于宪法的要求，比如：马虎的警察仅仅因为技术性违法行为而导致证据被排除，实际上其可以通过合法的方式发现这些证据。[24]唯其如此，法院已经将前述这种情况认定为非法证据排除规则的例外。同时，非法证据排除规则本身只在警察通过非法搜查获得有罪证据时才适用。当我们不能令人信服地证明该规则确实阻却了警察任何违宪行为时，很难眼睁睁地看着罪犯被无罪释放。代价

为了更加具体明晰地阐释非法证据排除规则的功效，该规则的支持者们通常通过实证研究和随机取证[DY1] （如通过坊间传闻、日常观察）确定警察的行为在该规则影响之下发生了多大的改变。这些研究表明实际上证据很少被排除，而排除证据导致刑事追诉彻底失败的案例更是凤毛麟角。[25]有些追诉之所以失败是因为这些案件涉及非法持有型犯罪，比如：在非法 持有毒品的案件中，被扣押的毒品是决定性证据，如果将其排除将导致追诉彻底失败。同时，排除证据导致追诉失败的案例很少涉及暴力犯罪。[26]研究者还指出自从非法证据排除规则适用于各州以来，警察申请搜查令状的数量大大增加，这说明警察在该规则影响之下确实开始调整其行为使之符合宪法。[27]警察培训资料也同样反映出遵守宪法对搜查扣押的规定变得日益重要。

非法证据排除规则的反对者认为人们很难准确地收集上述实证研究数据，而全面充分地解释这些数据更是难上加难。[28]很少的证据排除量只能说明原来不守法的警察现在也开始假装遵守宪法的规定，或者说明法官不均衡地适用这一规则。[29]但我们不能就此认定警察的改变全是因非法证据排除规则而起。不过，无论该规则是否是违宪行为理想的救济措施，十分明确的一点是该规则确实使得警察和公民日趋重视宪法性权利，并将与之有关的议题带入了法律的实施过程之中。

另一个关于非法证据排除规则的争论焦点在于该规则仅仅间接保护了无辜的被告人。只有确实有罪的人可以利用这一规则自我保护并且从中得到不正当的利益，而真正的无辜者在受到非法搜查的侵害后只能寻求其他途径的救济。但是，联邦最高法院认为该规则并不是一种个人权利，也不是一种修复个体伤害的措施，而仅仅是被用以阻却未来的违法行为。[30]同时，由于非法证据排除规则是依刑事被告人的申请而启动，因而批评者认为对警察施加惩罚是比该规则更适当的一种救济措施。这种惩罚不仅阻却了警察的不法行为，同时还直接给无辜的不法行为受害者提供了救济。在近期的案例中，联邦最高法院认为可以改用民事侵权性质和行政性质的救济措施，从而减少非法证据排除规则的应用。[31]但是，该规则的支持者却认为这些救济措施在发挥真正的阻却作用方面并不具备充分的可行性；同时，由于直接惩罚警察的做法将过度阻却警察的行为使其不愿再实施任何搜查行为，因此这反而会给有罪的被告人带来意外之利。

人们对非法证据排除规则阻却不法行为的有效性也怀有疑问。批评者认为该规则在审判中发挥的作用很难影响到马路上的警察行为。与定罪相比，警察更关注逮捕，因此该规则惩罚的对象是检察官而非警察。同时，由于惩罚只及于检察官，这意味着警察基于其他目的而实施的不法行为（比如：没收毒品或骚扰行为）完全不会受到该规则的任何影响。警察在误认为其行为合法的情况下所作出的违法行为同样不能被该规则所阻却。非法证据排除规则的支持者认为这些批评忽视了该规则的要点，即该规则并不关注单个的违法行为，而是促使警察意识到宪法性议题并且遵守宪法的规定，从而使警察的行为发生系统性的改变。虽然人们几乎无法证明如果没有非法证据排除规则警察的不法行为就会增加，但支持者们还是指出自该规则适用于各州之后，警察开始大量地使用宪法培训资料，职业素养也在不断提高。然而令人感到讽刺的是，这种职业素养的提高在另一方面恰恰证明了人们不再需要非法证据排除规则。[32]

二、非法证据排除规则的适用范围与例外

1、原始证据与派生证据（毒树之果）

非法证据排除规则不仅禁止使用在非法搜查扣押过程中直接取得的证据，还禁止使用因非法搜查而间接取得的证据。[33]任何在合法搜查与 扣押 中可以获取的证据都是原始证据，而以非法搜查获取的信息为线索所取得的证据是派生证据。这种被先前违法行为污染的派生证据不仅包括实物证据，还包括在非法逮捕后取得的供述与自白，[34]在搜查中发现的证人所作出的证言，[35]甚至警察以违法行为强迫被告人作出的证言。一个根据被非法逮捕的犯罪嫌疑人所作出的供述而发现的藏毒地点并不具备可采性，因为该地点是因非法逮捕而被发现的。不排除这种证据将会损害非法证据排除规则的阻却价值，因为警察在得知采用非法侦查手段取得的证据具有可采性后将会继续实施这种不法行为。[36]无论是作为审判的证据，还是作为获取其他证据的手段，不能出于任何目的而使用非法收集的证据，这样才能保证禁止收集非法证据规则的有效性。[37]这种排除间接证据的方法被称为“毒树之果理论”。 [38]

虽然禁止使用派生证据的规则最初形成于违反宪法第四修正案的非法搜查和扣押的情形之中，但其他违宪情形也可以适用该规则。以违反宪法第六修正案的情形为例：如果律师没有出席一个排队辨认程序，那么不仅该场程序中的辨认结果须被排除，而且任何之后得出的以该场辨认程序结果为基础的法庭辨认结果均须被排除。[39]在Kastigar v. United States案件中，联邦最高法院认为宪法第五修正案反对强迫自证其罪的规定同样禁止使用以被迫作出的供述为线索而取得的派生证据。[40]第五修正案排除派生证据规则与第四修正案排除派出证据规则十分相似，很难界定这两者的适用范围是否完全相同。一个显著的例外就是当警察在讯问前只因技术性原因而没有发出米兰达警告时，在讯问中获取的证据不须被排除。这是因为米兰达警告只是一种防止使用非自愿证据的预防性措施，被告人在讯问中自愿作出的供述不须被排除。[41]

逼迫

2、减弱规则

并非所有被不法行为污染的派生证据都要被排除。因为有些因违宪行为取得的派生证据与违宪行为相隔甚远，即该派生证据的违法性已经大为减弱，因而不须被排除。比如：一个被告人被非法逮捕之后，有一个出于自愿的独立行为的介入分隔开了非法逮捕行为与任意自白行为，那么该自白则具有 可采性。一个在这方面的案例就是经历非法逮捕的被告人被释放后又自愿返回警察处并自愿作出自白。[42]虽然警察在讯问前发出米兰达警告被视为是一种可以保证被告人供述自愿性的方法，但是当被告人被非法逮捕之后，仅仅阅读米兰达警告并不能保证自白的自愿性，也不能切断自白与非法逮捕行为之间的关联。[43]用于判断一个自愿的行为是否可以打破派生证据与先前非法行为之间关联的其他因素包括先前违法行为与自白之间的时间间隔长度，之后出现的其他介入情况，警察错误行为的目的与恶劣程度。[44]另一个和减弱规则有关的情形是：警察虽然有逮捕的合理依据，但是却以违反宪法第四修正案的方式在被告人的居所中逮捕了被告人，被告人随即作出了供述，如果作出供述的地点是在被告人的居所之外，那么可以认为供述受到先前非法逮捕行为的污染已经减弱，因而该供述具备可采性。[45]

警察在违宪行为中发现的证人所作出的证言在某些情况下仍然具有可采性，即有证人自愿的行为介入将其证言与先前的违法行为分割开来。与在非法搜查中发现的实物证据不同，证人可以自己选择是否作证。[46]判断上述证人证言是否具备可采性应该考虑以下四个因素：第一，证人是否是自愿作证；第二，警察的违法行为对发现证人起到了多大的作用；第三，警察的违法行与强迫证人作证行为之间的关系；第四，警察实施非法搜查的动机。[47]

另一个特殊的情形是被告人在几个不同的场合分别作出了自白，此时很难判断这些自白是否都受到了先前违宪行为的污染。联邦最高法院认为无论被告人因何原因就某项罪行作出了自白，今后其从心理上都很容易再就此罪作出自白 k口才获取。因此，如果最初的自白是非法行为的产物，任何紧随其后作出的自白都在一定程度上是最初自白的派生物。[48]联邦最高法院并不认为应该将之后所有的自白都排除，而是应该考虑最初的自白是以何种违法行为获得的。当不具可采性的最初自白是在违反宪法第五修正案的非自愿的情况下作出时，联邦最高法院会考虑最初的强迫行为是否也影响了随后作出的自白。[49]当最初的自白是以如非法逮捕等违反宪法第四修正案的方式获取时，联邦最高法院会考虑最初的自白是否影响了随后的自白。[50]这两种判断方法以不同的宪法修正案排除规则为基础，但实际上都是在考察随后的自白是否独立于先前的违法行为。

虽然仅仅在技术上违反米兰达警告规则而取得的证据不须被排除，但是如果警察起初出于诱供的目的没有发出米兰达警告，之后为了使被告人第二次作出的自白具有可采性而发出米兰达警告，这种米兰达警告被认为是无效的，因而第二次作出的自白同样不具自愿性和可采性。[51]普通的被告人很难意识到这前后两次自白在法律上有何区别，这使其在不知情的情况下放弃了米兰达规则所赋予的权利。

3、善 意的例外

如果警察在侦查时客观合理并且善意地相信其行为是符合法律的，即使该行为实际上是违法的，取得的证据也具有可采性，因为排除这些证据的阻却价值十分微小。由此可见，如果警察合理地相信一个独立的治安法官签发的令状是有效的并且依此令状执行任务，但后来发现签发该令状缺乏合理的依据，在这种情况中排除证据不会改变警察的行为。[52]不。不过在下列情形中，警察对令状的信任不被认为是客观合理的：第一；令状基于执法机关的失实陈述（或不顾及事实就作出陈述）而发出；第二，治安法官明显放弃了其司法独立的立场；第三，令状从表面上看起来内容不全；第四，所依证据并未给签发令状提供合理的依据。[53]平 平 probable cause

同样地，警察根据某成文法进行搜查，但之后该法被判违宪，这并不导致证据的排除。[54]因为在这种情况中排除证据的阻 却价值很小，这是由于人们不能要求警察持续不断地质疑其所实施的法律的合宪性。如果法院书记员错误地向警察保证法官签发了令状，而警察据此实施了逮捕行为，此时获取的证据不应被排除。因为警察并非对做出非法行为满不在乎，而是受到了书记员的误导。同时，由于书记员并未对审判结果投入任何成本，因而审判结果对其也并无阻却作用。[55]

在近期的判例中，一个警察被其他警察的错误所误导而收集的证据也被认为具有可采性。[56]在其他警察错误地告知附近的警察确有令状存在后，该警察实施了搜查并且发现了毒品和武器，联邦最高法院认为排除这些证价值很小。因为，警察根据错误的记录作出了错误的告知，但这种记录仅仅是记录者过失行为的结果，并且作出错误记录的警察与之后发生的案件和实施侦查行为的警察相距甚远。警察的侦查行为并不具有充分的可罚性以至于要排除其收集的证据，排除证据也无法阻却这种错误再次发生。法院已经反对在排除证据时必须证明警察具有恶意，因为这需要大量的对警察心理状态的推测。但是人们尚不确定的是，排除证据时必须要证明警察的心理状态不仅仅是过失的要求是否也会造成对警察心理的过度推测。

4、独立来源的例外

因违宪行为而取得的证据并不一定都被排除，如果该证据具有与违法行为完全无关的独立来源，那么该证据则具有可采性。[57]一个经典的案例是：警察在没有合理依据的情况下逮捕了一个抢劫犯罪嫌疑人，并且提取了他的指纹，该指纹最终被排除。不过，在实施非法逮捕行为之前，警察曾在一个与之后非法逮捕行为完全无关的活动中提取了指纹，该指纹可以在法庭上使用，因为它并非源于非法逮捕。[58]一个以合法方式取得的证据不能仅仅因为也曾被非法取得就被排除。

之后的判例分析了独立来源与违法行为需要相隔多远才能使有独立来源的证据具有可采性。在Segura v. United States案中，警察没有令状非法侵入某地，并且停留在该地保全了现场，而另一批警察基于在非法入侵发生之前就已掌握的信息获得了搜查证。[59]在审判中，被告人要求排除那些在第一次非法搜查中没有被发现而在第二次合法搜查中被发现的证据。联邦最高法院认为尽管警察在非法搜查的过程中可能保全了证据，使得随后的合法搜查可以获取该项证据，但是随后的合法搜查仍然是一个独立于先前非法行为的证据来源。

在Murray v. United States案中，警察虽然掌握了获取搜查证所需的合理根据，但是仍旧在没有搜查证的情况下非法侵入了某地并且发现了其意料之中的毒品。[60]警察保留了现场的原状，之后取得了搜查证扣押了毒品，支撑治安法官签发令状的证据是在非法入侵之前就已被警察获得的，警察也并未向治安法官提及非法入侵之事。联邦最高法院认为只要警察没有被在非法搜查中获取的信息所激发从而决定申请搜查证，该证据就具有可采性。在该案中，警察申请令状进行合法搜查的意图并非因非法搜查而起，因而也就成为了独立于非法搜查的证据来源。

5、必然发现的例外

有时候，即便没有警察的违宪行为，一项证据最终也必然被发现，那么该证据则具有可采性。独立来源的例外关注的是警察是否通过未被污染的其他合法途径获取了证据，而必然发现的例外关注的是如果没有警察的非法行为，一项证据是否会被发现。如果检察官可以通过优势证据证明合法的侦查行为可以发现这些证据，那么该证据不适用非法证据排除规则。这一例外的依据同样是阻却理论，因为阻却作用是通过排除警察以非法手段获取的不当利益而实现的。排除以合法手段必然发现的证据将会把警察置于比实施非法行为之前更糟的境地，这超越了非法证据排除规则的要求，同时增加了更多的不合理的成本。[61]

为了避免必然发现的例外被大量使用最终瓦解了非法证据排除规则，同时为了使人们在使用该规则时把焦点放在有证可查的事实而非假设上，[62]一些下级法院认为在违法行为发生时能够发现证据的合法行为应该正在进行当中。[63]该要求与Nix v. Williams一案的案情正好吻合，即虽然违宪取得的犯罪嫌疑人自白使警察发现了被害人的尸体，但实际上正在执行搜查任务的另一批警察很快就将在藏尸地点搜出尸体。[64]

然而，联邦最高法院近期审理的一个案例却扩大了必然发现例外的适用范围。在Hudson v. Michigan一案中，[65]手持合法搜查证的警察在强行入室之前没有适当地敲门并说明其正在执行搜查任务。法院认为警察在被告人家中获取的毒品具有证据可采性，因为这些毒品终将被发现。如果警察适当地说明其正在执行任务，那么其搜查行为将是合法的。毋庸置疑，这种观点引起了争论，人们尚不确定该观点将会如何影响其他案件的判决。

6、证据不用于刑事诉讼时的例外

法院认为当证据被用于非刑事审判中时，排除证据的阻却作用十分微小。比如：不能以证据是违法取得为由而质疑大陪审团的起诉书，[66]同时在大陪审团审理期间作证的证人不能以证据是非法取得为由拒绝作证。[67]之后进行的刑事审判程序为被起诉的被告人提供了充分的机会质疑证据的合法性，这已足以阻却警察的违法行为。[68]在假释听审阶段排除证据所消耗的成本也大于其阻却价值，因为警察更关心的是收集刑事审判证据而非用于这种行政性审理程序的证据，所以排除这种证据不会对警察产生阻却作用。[69]对于为假释听审程序投入更多成本的假释官而言，纪律性审判与惩罚已经足以阻却其违法行为。[70]尽管移民官有可能为了处理案件而非法取证，但是在审理驱逐出境案件时，阻却作用不是排除证据的充分理由。这是因为要求法院忽视证明正在进行中的犯罪（非法入境停留）的证据会不合理地增加非法证据排除规则的成本。[71]最后，虽然民事税务程序是一种准刑事程序，但非法证据排除规则仍不适用于其中，因为在刑事审判中排除证据就足以发挥阻却警察违法行为的作用，因而没有必要扩大非法证据排除规则的适用范围至税务程序。[72]

7、证据在刑事审判中不用于指控犯罪（用于反驳被告人）

当把非法取得的证据用于反驳被告人的证言时，该证据具有可采性。为了检验被告人的可信性，从之前发生的与当前案件无关的审判中排除的证据可以被采用，以此否定当前被告人证言的真实性。[73]这样做的理由是被告人不能利用非法证据排除规则帮助自己成功地作出伪证。

甚至与审判罪行直接相关的或在该案的侦查程序中收集的证据也可以被用于揭穿被告人的伪证。[74]被告人有权反驳控罪，并且要求排除非法取得的证据，但是这种证据可以被用于驳斥被告人所作出的伪证。[75]不过，如果政府希望使用非法取得的证据驳斥被告人针对政府在反询问中提出的问题所作出的回答，那么被告人在主询问中的证言必须已经合理地涉及了这些问题，政府不应仅仅为了使用非法证据而提出这些问题。[76]

一般而言，为了反驳被告人的伪证，政府可以使用违反米兰达规则和违反宪法第四修正案禁止非法搜查与扣押的规定而取得的证据。[77]警察很少会为了收集反驳被告人的证据而实施非法行为，同时，使用反驳被告人的证据也不会减弱宪法第四修正案和米兰达规则的阻却作用。[78]但是，当反驳被告人的证据是被告人的非任意性自白时，且这种自白并不仅仅是以违反米兰达规则的方式而取得时，该自白仍应被排除。这是因为该自白本身不具有可信性，而且宪法第五修正案直接禁止强迫自证其罪。[79]不过，当警察违反宪法第六修正案在律师不在场的情况下提取了被告人的供述，如果可以证明这些供述是在自愿的情况下作出的，则该供述可以成为具有可采性的反驳被告人的证据。[80]

一般而言，警察不能使用非法收集的证据反驳除被告人以外的其他人。法院认为这样做不仅无益于发现案件事实，同时还会造成非法证据的滥用。[81]当警察发现应被排除的证据经常可以因一些原因而被使用时，非法证据排除规则的阻却作用就会降低，同时被告人也会因害怕证据被用于反驳自己的证言而不再提供辩方证人。

8、资格的例外

“资格”指的是依照宪法的要求，有权质疑政府行为合宪性的主体必须与这种质疑有充分的利益关联。[82]从非法证据排除规则的角度看，只有非法行为侵害了一个人的个人权利，该人才有权要求排除因非法行为获取的证据。[83]这意味着即使警察实施非法行为取得证据的目的是指控被告人，被告人也没有资格要求排除侵害第三人权利时取得的证据。[84]

由于联邦最高法院认为被告人在证明了其已遭受违宪行为的侵害后方具有要求排除证据的资格，因此考察被告人是否具有资格的过程也是一个考察违宪行为是否发生的过程。[85]然而，在共同犯罪的案件中适用资格的例外成为一个极为严重的问题。这是因为即使法院认定该案中所有的证据都是非法取得的，被告人也可能在审判中没有质疑证据合法性的资格。举例来说：被告人B没有资格质疑在侵害被告人A的过程中取得的非任意性自白，因此被告人A的这些自白在审理被告人B的过程中仍然具有可采性。

当警察做出违反宪法第五修正案和第六修正案的行为时，人们很容易就能确定哪个人的个人权利受到了侵害。这是因为强迫自证其罪和不提供律师帮助的非法行为的指向性十分明确。然而，当警察违反宪法第四修正案进行非法搜查扣押时，人们较难确定一个搜查扣押行为侵害了谁的权益。一个搜查行为有可能侵害了多个人的权益。在这种情况下，联邦最高法院指出应有证据证明收集这些证据的手法侵害了被告人对被搜查地点的合法隐私期待。[86]因为法院判定被社会认为是合理的隐私期待即是合法的，[87]对隐私期待合理性的判断是针对具体的人和地点而做出的。这一标准是宪法所要求的最低标准，不过有些州扩展了资格的范围，比如：新泽西州法院认为所有对被扣押财产享受一部分权益的人都有资格质疑该证据的合法性。[88]

合法的隐私期待（有此即有资格质疑政府搜查扣押行为的合法性）存在于三种权利之中：第一，对被搜地点享有所有权；第二，在搜查期间合法地出现在该地；第三，对侦查人员取得的物品享有所有权。但是，享有上述权利并不意味着享有绝对的隐私权，权利的性质决定了何种隐私是可以被期待的。比如：临时搭朋友车的乘客不能对汽车仪表盘上的储藏柜怀有隐私期待（搭车者很少会打开这些柜子），但是他可以对车厢怀有隐私期待。[89]

房屋的所有者和租户对该屋怀有隐私期待。即便警察实施搜查行为时其不在场，其仍然怀有隐私期待。[90]由于被告人有权与他人共有旅馆的房间[91]和公用的办公地点[92]，因此被告人对这些地方享有隐私权。当人们共用一处时，一个人不可能对另一个人单独使用的地方享有隐私权，比如一个室友不可能对另一个室友的私人卧室享有隐私权。[93]

在搜查期间合法停留在搜查现场的人对该地也怀有部分的隐私期待。最明显的例子是到别人家中做客并且过夜的客人期待主人可以保护他们的隐私。[94]而对于那些没有在主人家过夜的客人而言，其怀有的隐私期待就相对较少，这取决于其和主人的关系、访问的性质与时间的长短。[95]当人们出现在商务场合或出于商业目的而出现在某地时，隐私期待相对较低；而当人们因社交活动而出现在某人的居所中时，隐私期待相对较高。[96]

对被扣押物品享有的所有权并不足以派生出一个完全受保护的隐私权。[97]当判断被告人是否有资格质疑扣押行为的合法性时，搜查地点也是一个必须考虑的因素。比如：如果被告人迅速地将其持有的毒品藏入一个临时遇到的熟人的书包里，那么他就没有资格质疑警察搜查该书包与扣押毒品的行为。[98]如果被告人认为自己有资格，他必须证明他可以自由存取那个书包或者享有不让别人接触那个书包的权利。同样地，写信人一旦寄出信件，就对该信件失去了隐私期待，因为其已经对信件失去了控制权，信件即将成为收件人的财产。[99]

三、非法证据排除规则的程序

虽然宪法决定了非法证据排除规则的实体性规则并且使之在全美范围内标准化，但是各州法院以及联邦法院适用的非法证据排除规则的程序却各不相同。宪法同样对该规则的程序问题作出了一些规定，但是美国各州已经成为了适用不同程序的试验田。提出排除证据动议时间的不同以及证明标准的不同反映了各州在司法效率、保护被告人权利以及警察权力之间所做出的精妙的平衡。

1、排除证据的动议

（1）时间

当被告人认为政府向法院提交的证据系非法获取时，提出排除证据动议的主体是被告人。[100]在联邦法院中，这种动议必须在审前提出，如果被告人在无特殊理由的情况下没有在审前提出动议，那么法院将认为其放弃了该项权利。[101]这保证了审判程序的焦点集中在定罪问题上。同时，让诉讼双方充分了解何种证据可以在审判中使用可以鼓励其达成认罪协议。

如果被告人在审判过程中提出了排除证据的动议，联邦法院的法官有自由裁量权决定是否接受该项动议。法官接受该动议的好处是可以帮助那些直到审判开始才发现排除证据理由的被告人。如果法官拒绝接受该项动议，被告人可以在上诉程序中质疑法官的决定，但是必须要证明法官滥用了自由裁量权并且对被告人造成了实质损害。与上诉有关的具体程序问题将在下文中阐述。

虽然许多州法院与联邦法院适用的程序一致，但是有些州却规定了不同的提出排除证据动议的时间。有些州的规则比联邦规则宽松，要求被告人在政府向法院出示证据之前或之时提出排除证据的动议。[102]不过，有些州的法律具体规定了被告人必须在审判之前的多少天内提出动议，以此限制法官的自由裁量权。[103]有些州甚至立法规定了提出排除证据动议时间的例外，即在某些特殊情况下法官必须接受仅在审判阶段提出的动议，或者详细列举了法官在决定是否听审迟发的动议时应当考虑的因素。[104]这些时间要求上的变化反映了平衡司法资源、司法公正以及全面审查重要的宪法性问题的需要。

（2）出示证据、证明责任、证明标准[DY2]

联邦法律要求被告人在提出排除证据的动议时必须详细说明排除证据的理由以及寻求何种救济。被告人在提出动议时必须阐明要求排除哪些证据以及排除这些证据的法律基础。这意味着被告人必须说明排除证据的法律原理，比如：警察在没有令状的情况下实施了扣押。同时，绝大多数管辖法院都要求被告人提供事实依据，这些事实不仅应该是真实的，而且还应该可以支持排除证据的要求。上述证明材料可以宣誓陈述书的形式提交。在提出排除证据动议时提交的所有证明材料必须是确实的而非经推测产生的，这样法官才能决定是否听取该项动议。如果书面证词是依据其他信息和主观想法而作出的，那么只有在被告人说明其主观想法的来源与依据时这些书面证词才可以被法院采纳。

一个准备充分的动议会引起排除证据听审程序的启动。该程序一般都在审前进行，这是为了使被告人在提早知道哪些有罪证据将在审判中出示后安排辩护策略，决定其是否要出庭作证以及是否接受辩诉交易。联邦法院的法官可以将排除证据的听审权交给治安法官，但之后联邦法院的法官必须确认最终是否排除证据，或者推翻治安法官的决定举行第二次听审。排除证据听审程序所适用的证据规则较为宽松，因而法官有较大的自由裁量权决定是否采信某些证据，甚至于有些依照常规证据规则不可采的证据都可以在该程序中被采信。[105]

联邦最高法院认为被告人在质疑证据合法性时所作出的证言不能被用于日后的定罪。[106]如果政府可以在审判中使用这些对被告人不利的证据，那么将导致被告人不敢质疑证据的合法性，并且使得案件中的宪法性问题得不到检验。很多被告人在提出排除证据的动议时都处于两难境地，比如：一个被控非法持有毒品的被告人想质疑作为证据的毒品是警察非法获取的，如果他要使自己具有提出动议的资格，他就必须承认对该毒品享有某种权利，但是他一旦承认这种权利就意味着他认可了可以证明其犯罪的关键因素。同样地，检察官也不能将证据听审程序视为一种可以通过交叉询问被告人从而获取更多证据的机会。[107]不过，被告人在此时作出的证言仍然可以在审判中被用于反驳被告人的伪证。[108]

证明责任

一般而言，由于被告人要求排除证据并且希望法官接受排除证据的动议，因而其有证明自己具有资格质疑证据合法性以及警察实施了违宪行为的责任。不过，基于警察违法行为种类的不同以及排除证据依据的不同，政府和被告人都有可能就其他问题承担证明责任。比如：被告人的自白具有任意性[109]、被告人放弃了米兰达权利[110]以及被告人放弃了律师帮助权这些问题必须由检察官证明。但是，被告人通常需要证明辩认程序存在不当的偏见。各州有权要求检察官承担任何的证明责任。[111]

警察是否是在获取了令状的前提下实施搜查与扣押直接影响了证明责任的分配。如果警察在没有令状的情况下实施搜查，那么检察官有责任使用优势证据证明警察的行为符合有证搜查的例外情形，从而该搜查扣押是合法的。[112]如果政府辩称其行为是得到相对人同意的，那么政府有责任证明该同意。[113]持有令状进行搜查被推定为是合法的。治安法官签发令状的行为证明了警察具有搜查的合理依据。因此，当警察持有令状时，被告人就需要证明该令状是无效的或者搜查的范围超越了令状的规定，并且证明搜查行为违宪。如果被告人成功地证明了这些事项，证据听审程序又回到了警察是在没有令状的情况下实施了搜查时的情形。此时证明责任再次转移到检察官身上，他需要证明搜查是合法的。

如果政府认为虽然其通过违宪行为获取了证据，但是该证据仍然具有可采性，因为符合独立来源的例外或必然发现的例外，那么检察官同时承担提出证据的责任与说服责任，通过优势证据证明政府的行为符合上述例外。[114]

“弗兰克斯”听审程序

通常情况下，被告人只能根据书面令状质疑警察搜查行为的合法性，不过被告人有时还可以警察误导治安法官从而获取令状为由质疑其搜查行为的合法性。在Franks v. Delaware一案中，[115]联邦最高法院认为根据宪法第四修正案应该举行证据听审程序，现在这被称为“弗兰克斯听审程序”。为了启动该程序，被告人必须初步证明警察做出了故意虚假陈述或者根本不顾及其陈述的真实性，而治安法官被此误导签发了令状。如果被告人在证据听审程序中可以通过优势证据证明上述情况，并且说明支撑法官签发令状的证据信息并不足以产生搜查的合理依据，那么原来签发的令状将被视为无效，搜查取得的证据也将被排除。有些法院认为如果警察以误导为目的或者不顾及其陈述真实性而故意隐瞒了事实，那么法院也可以据此进行弗兰克斯听审程序。[116]

2、上诉

根据联邦法律和部分州法律的规定，在法院对被告人提出的排除证据动议做出决定之后，只有控方有权对此立即提出庭审中的上诉，原因在于控方如果在定罪过程中败北通常就没有机会上诉，而被告即使输掉非法证据的动议，仍然可以在对定罪的上诉中继续提出对非法证据的质疑—虞平

。[117]然而，其他一些州法律允许诉讼任何一方对此提出上诉，还有一些州法律规定如果没有提交新的证据，任何一方都不得提出上诉。[118]在审判程序结束之后，被定罪的被告人如果仍然对证据怀有质疑，可以提出上诉。对此，有些上诉法院只考察在排除证据听审程序中出现的证据，但是联邦法律允许上诉法院同时考察审判中出现的证据。[119]

对被否决的排除证据动议进行复审总体上对政府一方有利。[120]除非被告人可以证明这种否决是完全错误的，或者证明没有充足的有记录的证据可以支撑这种否决，否则上诉法院不会推翻原审决定。[121]原审法院所作出的决定包含了事实问题和法律问题，上诉法院通常会认同一审法院对事实问题的裁决，如果相关记录不完整，就会将案件发回重审。[122]不过，上诉法院会对法律问题进行自主的重新审查。[123]

即使上诉法院认为原审法院对排除证据动议的否决是错误的，如果该错误仅仅是一个无害错误，没有影响被告人的实体性权利，那么上诉法院也不会推翻被告人的定罪。只有当有合理的可能性显示被告所质疑的证据导致了其有罪判决时，原审法院的决定才能被推翻。[124]政府有责任证明原审错误是一种排除合理怀疑的无害错误。[125]在判断该错误系无害时，法院会考察被质疑的证据对陪审团和判决产生了多大的影响，并且衡量证明同一事项的其他证据。如果其他证据充分证明了被告人是有罪的，那么对被质疑证据的采信将被视为一个无害的错误。[126]

从传统规则上来看，被告人一旦接受了辩诉交易即意味着放弃了质疑证据合宪性的权利。由于定罪的基础是被告人认罪而非证据，因此没有理由允许被告人以警察非法侦查为由质疑证据的合宪性。但是，一些州和联邦法院认为这种做法迫使被告人在排除证据动议被否决后进入一般审理程序，以此避免丧失就排除证据问题提出上诉的权利。在各州，一个解决上述问题的办法是立法规定给被告人保留这种上诉权。另一个解决办法是接受辩诉交易的被告人与政府达成协议规定被告人仍然享有质疑证据合法性的权利，但是联邦和各州尚未就法院能否批准这种协议达成一致意见。

[1] Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,  497-99 (1971). (Black, J., concurring and dissenting)

[2] Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437-444 (2000).

[3] United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639-40 (2004)

[4] Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).

[5] Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (2004.)

[6] United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

[7] Massiah at 206

[8] Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273 (1951)

[9] Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 (1977)

[10] Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)

[11] Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)

[12] Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)

[13] Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976)

[14] Id. at 492

[15] Corley v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1558,(2009).

[16] Ibid.

[17] Marbury v.Madison, 5. U.S. 137 (1803)

[18] Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833(1992)

[19] Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 700 (2009).

[20] Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).empirical

[21] Herring, 129 S.Ct at  700 (2009).

[22] Id.

[23] See e.g. Wayne LaFave, 1 Search and Seizure S 1.2, at 25-27 (3^rd. edition 1996).

[24] See e.g. Donald Dripps, Living with Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 919(1986).

[25] See e.g. Report of the Comptroller Gen., Impact of the Exclusionary Rule on Federal Criminal Prosecutions, Rep. CDG-79-75 (1979)

[26] See e.g. Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 44 (1994)

[27] See Bradley C. Cannon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a Plea against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 708-811 (1974).

[28] See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1365 (2008)

[29] See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to do About It, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037 (1996)

[30] Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)

[31] Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597-99 (2006)

[32] Id. at 599, Citing S. Walker, Taming the System: The Control of Discretion in Criminal Justice 1950-1990 51 (1993)

[33] Wong Sun V.v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963)

[34]Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601  (1975)

[35] United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978)

[36] Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939)

[37] Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920)

[38] Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341

[39] United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239-40 (1967)

[40] 406 U.S. 441, 449-51(1972)

[41] United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004)

[42] Wong Su, , 371 U.S. at 491

[43] Brown, 422 U.S. at 603

[44] Id. at 603

[45] New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18 (1990)

[46] Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277

[47] Id. at 275-277

[48] United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 541-42(1947)

[49] See e.g. Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 349(1968)

[50] Brown, 422 U.S. at 605

[51] Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 612-14 (2004)

[52] United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897， 916-17  (1984)

[53] Id. at 914-915

[54] Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987)

[55] Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1,  14(1995)

[56] Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 703(2009)

[57] Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, , 251 U.S. 385, 392(1920)

[58] United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 467 (1990) citing Bynum v. United States, 274 f.d2 767  (D.C.Cir.1960)

[59] 468 U.S. 796 (1984)

[60] Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988)

[61] Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)

[62] Id. at 444 n. 5

[63] See United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 580 (5^th Cir, 2008)

[64] Nix, 467 U.S. 431

[65] 547 U.S. 586, 600 (2006)

[66] Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 408 (1956)

[67] United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-352 (1974)

[68] United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966)

[69] Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364 (1998)

[70] Id. at 368

[71] INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1984)

[72] United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 448, 454 (1976)

[73] Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1957)

[74] Harris v. New York,401 U.S. 222, 225  (1971)

[75] Walder, 347 U.S. at 65.

[76] United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 631(1980)

[77] See e.g., Harris, 401 U.S. 222

[78] Id. at 225

[79] Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-402 (1978)

[80] Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344,  (1990)

[81] James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 314 (1990)

[82] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08 (1962)

[83] Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-135 (1978)

[84] Id. at 136-37

[85] Id. at 140

[86] Id. at 143

[87] Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 (1990)

[88] State v. Johnson, 193 N.J. 528, 547 (NJ S.Ct. 2008)

[89] Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49

[90] Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176 (1969)

[91] See e.g. Stoner v. State of California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)

[92] See e.g. Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)

[93] See e.g. Northern v. United States, 455 F.2d 427, 430 (C.A.9 1972)

[94] Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990)

[95] Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1998)

[96] Id. at 90

[97] Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980)

[98] Id.

[99] United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1996 (6^th Cir. 1995)

[100] Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(h)

[101] Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e)

[102] See e.g.  Nelson v. State, 626 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)

[103] See e.g. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §255.20(1) (must be filed within 45 days of arraignment)

[104] See e.g. Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5(h). (motion made at trial because defendant was unaware of grounds pre-trial, motion must be entertained)

[105] United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,(1994); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 104(a).

[106] Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390-91 (1968).

[107] Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 104(d).

[108] United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).

[109] Lego v. Twomey  404 U.S. 477 (1972)

[110] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

[111] Ariz. Rules Crim. Proc §16.2(b)- placing the burden on the prosecution)

[112] U.S. v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5^th Cir. 1971)

[113] Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)

[114] See e.g. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).

[115] Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

[116] See e.g. United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 961 (8^th Cir. 1986)

[117] 18 U.S.C. §§3731,2518(10)(b).

[118] Cal. Penal Code §1583.5(j)(allowing appeals by either party)); Pa. R. Crim. P. 581(J)(forbidding appeals by either party unless new evidence is discovered).

[119] See e.g. U.S. v. Alvarez-Becerra, 33 Fed.Appx. 403 (10th Cir. 2002)(trial evidence accepted); State v. Gora, 148 N.J. Super. 582 (App. Div. 1977)(trial evidence barred at appeal).

[120] United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 49 (2^nd Cir. 1977).

[121] United States v. Patterson ,292 F.3d 615 (9^th Cir. 2002); United States vs. Jobin, 535 F.2d 154 (1^st Cir. 1976)

[122] Patterson (2002)

[123] United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331 (11^th Cir. 1976)

[124] Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a)

[125] Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1972)

[126] United States v. Rhind, 289 F.3d 690 (11^th Cir. 2002)