A few notes on the Ethnic Unity Law

This is not an overview of the Ethnic Unity Law, because Articles, like that by NPC Observer, have already done an admirable job of explaining how the law codifies the current assimilationist phase of China’s ethnic and religious policies.

Instead, this post shares a few additional comments on the law on:

Religious and Ethnic Policy
Global Context
Extraterritoriality

General Religious and Ethnicity Policy

I intentionally combine ethnicity and religion here, not only because they are frequently linked in reality, but also because Chinese law often expressly connects them. For example, the new draft, in its efforts to create a shared common identity for the Chinese people, frequently groups ethnicity and religion together both as aspects of group identity (articles 12, 46) and as potentially divisive forces (Articles 10, 40, 53). Article 62, discussing possible criminal offenses, goes so far as to group terrorism, religious extremism, and ethnic division together.

Beyond this law, in China’s ongoing campaign to combat underworld forces [扫黑除恶], local implementation rules consider ethnic and religious leaders similarly- as potential disruptors of stable governance.

My thinking on China’s ethnic and religious policies always comes back to 2017 Beijing Declaration from the South-South Human Rights Forum ‘s interpretation on the rights of minority and vulnerable populations. The rest is implementation. It’s article 6 reads:

States should, in accordance with their national laws and international obligations, focus on guaranteeing the human rights and fundamental freedoms of specific groups, including ethnic, national, racial, religious and linguistic groups and migrant workers, people with disabilities, indigenous people, refugees and displaced persons. States have an obligation to respect and protect religious minorities, and religious minorities have the same obligation to adapt to their local environment, and this includes the acceptance and observance of the Constitution and laws of their localities, as well as their integration into the local society. Everyone has the right to choose his or her own beliefs, including the choice of believing or not believing a religion, and the choice of believing one religion or another, without being discriminated.

To paraphrase：

States’ obligations to respect and protect minorities are counterbalanced by minorities’ corresponding obligations to assimilate.
Freedom of religion includes freedom from religion, and both are protected by the state.

The first part means that the freedom of religious and cultural expression only goes so far as it doesn’t interfere with the mainstream culture. The mainstream culture here is defined by the Party-state, and one can see this rule in operation in documents such as on the Sinification of Religions (Christianity, Islam) and in requirements for religious groups and clergy to follow the leadership of the Communist Party.

The second part is a ban on proselytization, but also creates a barrier to including children in religious activities. Because they lack the capacity to choose a religion, the state protects their freedom from religion by prohibiting their participation in religious activities. This obviously greatly limits intergenerational transmission.

Taken together, the impact of these two principles is to reduce minority cultures and religion in scope and longevity. The state encourages religious leaders to find the parts of their faiths that affirm mainstream Core Socialist Values and downplay the rest. Religion exists as a temporary nuisance that should exist in a controlled state.

Global Context

I think it’s worth noting that China isn’t alone at this moment in trying to establish a cohesive national identity at the expense of minorities. China’s codification of assimilationist policies should be viewed in the global context as well as China’s domestic historical context. I won’t pretend to have answers, but it is clear that we are in a transitional era, and States and peoples today are searching for stronger national narratives and cultural solidarity. National security fears seem regularly linked with xenophobia. China’s policies and actions shouldn’t be equated with the situation elsewhere, but considering China’s policy in isolation unnecessarily views it as exceptional and helps us avoid difficult self-reflection.

It is also noteworthy that the rhetoric of China’s policies here differs from that of nationalist movements elsewhere. The language invokes “unity” and “solidarity”, despite working to reduce the political and cultural impact of minority groups by assimilation and incorporation. Anti-immigration movements in the US and elsewhere, by contrast, have increasingly flirted with open racism and bigotry focused on distinguishing true nationals. As we’ve seen in boarding schools for native Americans in the US and Canada, and in China’s Xinjiang policies, forced assimilation might be aimed at integration, but is hardly kind in the present.

Extraterritoriality

Much has been written about the Ethnic Unity Law’s Article 63 and its express extraterritorial application.

Article 63: Organizations and individuals outside the [mainland] territory of the P.R.C. that commit acts aimed at the P.R.C. that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division are to be pursued for legal responsibility in accordance with law.

I don’t think that this provision actually does anything new, and I would argue that any criticism should concern what conduct China penalizes rather than the extraterritoriality.

Criminal Law Article 6 authorizes what is called ‘territorial jurisdiction’ over offenses where the consequences of a crime are felt in China – even if the criminal acts occurred outside of China. In our globalized world, one can see how this type of jurisdiction is necessary for states to prosecute telecom fraud, blackmail, and other offenses that can be conducted online from overseas. The same jurisdictional rule applies to China’s public security administration penalties (at Article 10) used to punish minor offenses not rising to the level of criminality.

It’s hard to imagine how the impact of “acts aimed at the P.R.C. that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division” could occur anywhere other than in China. The ‘ethnic unity’ being undermined here is in China, after all.

Don Clarke has made a very helpful overview of other possible grounds for criminal jurisdiction, as well as what charges might be applied, but I think Article 6 provides a sufficient basis for jurisdiction that does not need to consider the nationality of the offender or whether the conduct was criminal where it occurred. This type of territorial jurisdiction is neither new nor unique to China.

What is troubling here is not the extraterritorial reach, but the conduct being penalized. As Prof. Clarke points out, the relevant criminal offenses have been stretched to include a wide range of conduct, including speech and religious practice. Countries that place great importance on the protecting speech and religious expression are right to be concerned that China might punish punish individuals for protect conduct that occured within their borders.

Finally, it’s worth mentioning that the legal liability here could be also be civil, rather than administrative or criminal. A recent draft of the Procuratorate Public Interest Law suggests that this might be being considered, as it includes ‘ethnic unity’ as one of the potential areas for state-initiated mass litigation for the public good.

As part of China’s increased emphasis on foreign-related law, it is including express mentions of extraterritorial application in laws, even if such authority was already claimed. In this case, I don’t think it’s the most interesting thing about the law.

Cite this as:

Translate, China Law. "A few notes on the Ethnic Unity Law." China Law Translate. 2026. Accessed on September 29, 2026 at 10:30. https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/a-few-notes-on-the-ethnic-unity-law/.

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