Did China make sexting illegal?

A Chinese media report published in late December 2025 set off an online furor, with headlines warning that the private exchange of “indecent” images, even between consenting adults, would soon become illegal. Foreign media quickly picked up the story, saying that “new regulations” could soon penalize even “consensual sexting.”

The story went viral. It was also wrong.

Within days, Chinese state-media outlets and legal experts moved quickly to correct the misinterpretation. The original article was taken down, but not before multiple versions of it had spread online. AI chatbots, trained on the initial coverage, continue to recycle the claims in an increasingly familiar cycle of perpetuating misinformation.

Beyond the specific legal misunderstanding, the episode underscores a broader, familiar problem shared by both China and the United States:  the rapid speed at which misinformation spreads across media ecosystems, and its endurance even after correction.

So, what actually changed in the law.

The quick answer is “very little”.

The story stemmed from recent revisions to China’s  Public Security Administration Punishments Law (“PSAPL”), the law addressing low-level misconduct that falls short of justifying criminal charges, which took effect on January 1, 2026. Because the PSAPL allows police to directly punish citizens for minor offenses without a court trial, it is understandably of great interest to the public, and this is not the first debate to arise from the recent revisions.

This controversy surrounds Article 80 of the PSAPL, which addresses two types of misconduct related to “obscenity”:

1. Producing, transporting, reproducing, selling, or renting obscene materials such as books, videos, etc., and
2. Disseminating obscene information through information networks, telephones, and other means of communication.

These offenses have existed in the law since 2005, but the new round of revisions did make a few notable changes:

1. Renumbering. Moving the offense from Article 68 in the old law to Article 80 in the new law (to accommodate other additions and deletions) isn’t a substantive change, but makes side-by-side comparison harder for casual readers, making it easier to believe unfamiliar language was entirely new.
2.  Fines were increased for the article 80 offenses and also for many other offenses throughout the law. That the length of potential detention was left unchanged for these obscenity offenses suggests that the value increases may reflect adjustments for inflation and an increased preference for financial penalties over incarceration, rather than a reevaluation of the seriousness of the offense.
3. A second paragraph was added calling for higher penalties where minors are involved in the obscene materials or information. Generally, this is uncontroversial given the global emphasis on stopping sexual exploitation of minors. In 2020, China made it illegal to even possess child sexual abuse materials (CSAM) for the first time in its Law on the Protection of Minors. Unfortunately, there is no clear enforcement mechanism for that possession, and it’s regrettable that possession wasn’t added to this offense when revising the law.
4. The phrase “computer information systems” was shortened to simply “information systems” in the second offense. This one-word change, eliminating “computer”, seems to be the only revision that could impact the conduct covered by the law, so it will be discussed in greater detail below.

 TABLE 1: Shows the revisions in Chinese and English, with deletions highlighted in Red, additions in Green:

Where’s the Beef?

The mistaken domestic and foreign reporting seems concerned that “information networks” is a significantly broader category than “computer information networks,” and that this rephrasing greatly expands the  ‘dissemination’ now covered by the law. The idea is that “computer” limited the law’s application to a subset of ‘information networks’

Before considering whether that’s true, however, there are a few things to keep in mind, which might make the question less relevant:

1. Obscenity is not defined or expanded here. It’s clear from comparing the plain language of the original and revised versions of the law that nothing is added to alter the scope of “obscenity” in either the obscene materials or obscene information If the revisions expand the offenses at all, it can only be in terms of how or where obscene information is disseminated, as there is no change in what information is obscene. [i]
2. In both versions of the Law, “(computer) information networks” is just one item in a list that also covers telephones and “other communications tools.” The rephrasing can only expand the offense if the new term (information networks) includes dissemination methods that fall outside both the old “computer information networks” and the catch-all “other communications tools.”
3. “Dissemination” likely already includes all digital media. In 2004, China’s highest court and prosecutors office released an interpretation expanding the enforcement of obscenity crimes into the digital sphere. That interpretation made clear that even though the Criminal Law did not mention digital technologies on its face, the existing criminal charges of ‘producing, reproducing, selling, or disseminating obscene materials” were broad enough to cover sharing digital information online in chatrooms, forums, instant messaging, e-mail, websites and so forth.When the PSAPL was released one year later in 2005, its obscenity offenses were updated to align with the criminal law interpretations by expressly including the use of computer networks and other electronic means of dissemination to spread ‘obscene information”. Public security administration offenses are non-criminal, but usually directly correspond to criminal offenses and apply similar interpretations.
4.  Neither version of the law distinguishes between private and public dissemination of obscene information. This is underscored by the inclusion of “telephone” as a means of dissemination. While multi-party conference calls are no longer uncommon, “telephone” on its face naturally includes ordinary private person-to-person calls, unless they are expressly excluded.

In some situations, it makes sense not to have an exemption for consensual private chats in obscenity charges. In many jurisdictions, for example, it’s illegal to transmit CSAM and other obscene materials through, regardless of where that happens.

Use of private channels can actually increase to the harm of sexually explicit materials when they are sent to harass a non-consenting recipient, but that situation is more appropriately addressed based on the intent to harass than the obscene nature of the content sent. The PSAPL contains a separate offense for this sort of harassment at article 50(5).[ii]

Sexting has always been illegal.

The specific language can and will be further dissected below, but the discussion thus far already strongly suggests the new revisions do not meaningfully expand Article 80’s scope.

This is likely little comfort to ordinary citizens, however, because it means that ‘sexting’ has always been illegal, even if they didn’t know it. It also means, however, that consensual sharing of obscene images of oneself with a partner hasn’t been a focus of enforcement.

Enforcement has instead focused on the harm to public order from spreading obscene materials, making private sharing between partners a low priority. In the criminal context, successive interpretations have consistently measured the severity of the offense by the volume of material shared, the size of the audience and impact, and the amount of profit gained (with additional penalties for impact on minors).

While there is regional variation in how police exercise their discretion to give public security administration penalties, they usually closely track the logic of criminal interpretations. Beijing’s police standards, for example, directly refer to the volume/numbers/profits set in the criminal interpretations.

While private sharing of indecent information about oneself with direct partners has been a low priority, the law never rules out the possibility. If legislators wanted, it would not be difficult to clarify that penalties should be waived in cases of sharing images of one’s own body with a sexual partner, but thus far interpretations have not done so. Perhaps the uproar over this article will inspire one to do so.

For now, Article 20 of the PSAPL allows that penalties may be waived or reduced where the offense is minor, as in cases with a single, consenting recipient.

Police Access

A practical matter for why obscenity charges haven’t reached ‘sexting’ is that, absent a complaint or forwarding to more parties, police aren’t likely to come across it. As a general rule, Chinese police are not reviewing the millions of texts and DMs sent every day, but can do so in an open criminal investigation. [iii]

Content moderation is generally ‘outsourced’ to the platforms. Platforms usually have the power to collect and scan messaging content in order to enforce rules against spam and illegal content [iv] and are required to report illegal content to the police. （Article 34）

During a 2010 campaign to fight obscenity online, police drafted the major mobile service providers to scan text messages for pornographic and obscene messages. At the time, the public was quite concerned about the invasion of privacy and even afraid of accidentally violating the rules by sending dirty jokes and pictures.

The enforcement, however, targeted mainly the mass sending of texts or sending texts to harass. The consequences usually involved interrupting transmission of individual texts or limiting texting functionality, although police could disable the phones.  Automated word filter systems have sometimes interrupted innocent messaging between consenting individuals, such as when a text saying “Let’s make a bet” to a friend was blocked as marketing gambling.

Today’s platform enforcement is likely to follow a similar pattern.

 Computer No Computer? Does it matter? (An unnecessarily deep dive)

For the reasons stated above, it doesn’t seem very worthwhile to deeply analyze whether “information systems” is a broader category than “computer information systems”. Sexting is covered by the clear language of the law in both the old and new versions of the PSAPL, but unlikely to be enforced.

For those interested, however, we can go down the rabbit hole to watch how imprecisely language has been used.

In 2021, the term “Information Networks” was defined expansively by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (China’s highest prosecution body) in its Provisions on Handling Cybercrime Cases:

“Article 61(1): “Information networks” include the computer Internet, radio and television networks, stationery communications networks, and mobile communication networks, that have computers, television sets, landline telephones, mobile telephones, or other electronic devices as their terminals, as well as local area networks;”

That definition is really very broad. It even includes telephone communications, which are listed separately from “(Computer) Information Systems” in the PSAPL provisions on dissemination of obscene materials.  The same term could have different meanings in different legal contexts, but the Criminal Law and PSAPL are closely linked, containing violations differing mainly on their seriousness, and it’s likely that the PSAPLwas adopting this language to align the laws.

The Cybercrime Provisions explicitly apply to all crimes “committed against information networks” OR “committed using information networks.”

Within the Criminal Law itself, however, the specific crimes do not consistently use the phrase “information networks.” That phrase only first entered the text of the Law with 2015’s Criminal Law Amendment (IX) and 2020’s Amendment (XI). Both of these Amendments were released after the two Cybercrime interpretations and seem to be embracing that new terminology.

Before then, following a major overhaul of the Criminal Law in 1997, a related term “computer information systems” (计算机信息系统) (not networks) was used.  This phrase only appeared in two articles, addressing hacking offenses (entering or taking control of computer systems), destruction of computer systems, and failure to perform legally-required duties to maintain computer systems.

That term, ‘computer information systems,’ was borrowed from other legal contexts, such as the 1994 Regulations on the Protection of Computer Information Systems, and likely had the same meaning:

“Computer Information System” as used in these Regulations, refers to a human–machine system composed of computers and their related supporting equipment and facilities (including networks), which, in accordance with specific application objectives and rules, carries out the collection, processing, storage, transmission, and retrieval of information

The PSAPL uses the similar phrase, “Computer information networks”, but notice that the definition of “computer information systems” here includes the word ‘network’ as a component of systems, making it even more unclear which is the larger category.

“Computer Information Networks” isn’t defined in national law that I could identify, but some local regulations do define it in a manner strikingly similar to definitions of “Computer Information Systems,”only adding further clarification that Internet connectivity isn’t required.

 “Computer Information Network” refers to a human–machine system composed of computers and their related and supporting equipment, in accordance with certain application objectives and rules, carries out the collection, processing, storage, transmission,, and retrieval of information, including computer information systems that are not connected to the Internet (including local area networks) and computer information systems that are connected to the Internet (including via wireless access).

In 2016, the Cybersecurity Law (literally the “Network Security Law”) embraced the term “network”, but defining it largely in line with the previous definition of ‘computer information systems”.

(1) “Networks” refers to systems composed of computers or other information terminals and related equipment that follow certain rules and procedures for information collection, storage, transmission, exchange and processing.

The Cybersecurity Law and some of the earlier rules on the protection of computer information systems or networks are not focused narrowly on criminal and administrative offenses and may have different understandings of these terms. Even still it becomes increasing clear that the terminology is not as clear as one might hope.

“Computer information systems” are defined using the word “network”, and Networks are defined as systems of computers. For the purposes of law enforcement, “information systems” includes ‘computer information systems” In the Cybersecurity Law, “network” seems to be expansive, although it might

What is clear, however, is that all of these terms are meant to be expansive and inclusive. They terminology seems to be changing to include emerging and future technologies, rather than to expand the scope of the law. Yesterday’s understanding of ‘computers’ or even ‘internet’ are already obsolete in an era of bluetooth and smart toilets- but the law is meant to cover ‘communication’ and that’s clear enough.

[i] The Public Security Administration Punishments Law does not define obscene materials or information. The Criminal Law does have a definition that is applied to the criminal offenses corresponding with PSAPL article 80, and this is applied in practice.

Article 367:　[Scope of Obscene Materials]“Obscene materials,” as used in this Law, refers to books, periodicals, films, videotapes, audiotapes, images, and other items that are lewd (lust-inciting) in nature and that specifically depict sexual conduct or openly promote explicit content.

Scientific works on human physiology and medical knowledge are not obscene materials.

Literary and artistic works of artistic value containing sexual content are not considered obscene materials

[ii] In 2014, the Ministry of Public Security actually addressed a seeming contradiction between the offenses of disseminating obscene materials to harass, versus the normal obscenity charges. While these charges are distinguishable by their intent, the harassment offense required ‘sending’ material multiple times, where a single dissemination could satisfy the general obscenity charge. Some officers felt that this made the harassment charge irrelevant. The Ministry clarified that these were separate offenses, with discrete harms and subjective intent, even if similar conduct might be involved. 公安部法制局对《治安管理处罚法》相关问题的网上解答（一）,.

[iii] Police generally have the power to access social media accounts etc., only after a case has been formally filed and an investigation has begun.This is not a terribly high standard, and is reviewed by other police. While I’ve never seen it, they could conceivably come across sexting while investigating another offense. https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/provision-on-collection-and-review-of-digital-information-in-criminal-cases/

[iv] Weibo’s User agreement specifically includes private messaging in content it ‘collects’ to enforce rules, but this is not necessarily the same as saying that a human reads DMs. See (Weibo User Agreement 4.12)

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CLT 是一个能够让说英语的人群进一步了解中国法律，众包、众筹的法律翻译项目。

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