Table of Contents
Chapter II: Authority of National Intelligence Work Institutions
Chapter III Protections for National Intelligence Work
Chapter IV: Legal Responsibility
Chapter V: Supplementary Provisions
(Adopted at the 28th session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People's Congress on June 27, 2017; amended in accordance with the "Decision on Amending the P.R.C. Frontier Health and Quarantine Law and Five Other Laws" by the 2nd session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People's Congress on April 27, 2018)
Chapter I: General Provisions
Article 1: This Law is formulated on the basis of the Constitution so as to strengthen and safeguard national intelligence work and to preserve state security and interests.
Article 2: National Intelligence work adheres to the overall national security perspective, provides intelligence as a reference in major national decision-making, provides intelligence support for the prevention and mitigation of threats endangering national security, and preserves the national political power, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity, the welfare of the people, sustainable social and economic development and other major national interests.
Article 3: The State is to establish and complete a national intelligence system that is centralized and united, that has a coordinated division of labor, and is scientific and highly effective.
The central national security leadership bodies are to carry out unified leadership of national intelligence efforts, formulate directives and policies for national intelligence work, plan the overall development of national intelligence efforts, establish and complete coordination mechanisms for national intelligence efforts, perform overall coordination of national intelligence efforts in various fields, and research and decide on major matters in national intelligence efforts.
The Central Military Commission uniformly leads and organizes military intelligence efforts.
Article 4: National intelligence efforts are to adhere to the principles of combining open and secret works, combining specialized efforts and the mass line, and combining divisions of labor and responsibility with assistance and cooperation.
Article 5: The intelligence institutions of state security organs and public security organs, and of military intelligence institutions, (hereinafter collectively referred to as "national intelligence work institutions") are to follow their duties and division of labor, to cooperate together, complete intelligence work, and carry out intelligence activities.
Each relevant national organ shall cooperate closely with national intelligence work institutions in accordance with their own functions and the division of tasks.
Article 6: The national intelligence work institutions and their staffs shall be loyal to the State and people, obey the constitution and laws, be devoted to their duties, highly disciplined, clean and honest, selflessly dedicated, and resolutely preserve the national security and interests.
Article 7: All organizations and citizens shall support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with law, and shall protect national intelligence work secrets they are aware of.
The State protects individuals and organizations that support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts.
Article 8: National intelligence efforts shall be conducted in accordance with law, shall respect and protect human rights, and shall preserve the lawful rights and interests of individuals and organizations.
Article 9: The State gives commendations and awards to individuals and organizations that make major contributions to national intelligence efforts.
Chapter II: Authority of National Intelligence Work Institutions
Article 10: As necessary for their work, national intelligence work institutions are to use the necessary means, tactics, and channels to carry out intelligence efforts, domestically and abroad.
Article 11: National intelligence work institutions shall lawfully collect and handle intelligence related to foreign institutions, organizations or individuals carrying out, directing or funding foreign or domestic institutions, organizations, or individuals colluding to carry out, conduct endangering the national security and interests of the People's Republic of China; so as to provide intelligence references and bases for preventing, stopping, and punishing the above conduct.
Article 12: In accordance with relevant State provisions, national intelligence work institutions may establish cooperative relationships with relevant individuals and organizations, and retain them to carry out related work.
Article 13: In accordance with relevant State provisions, national intelligence work institutions may carry out foreign exchanges and cooperation.
Article 14: National intelligence work institutions lawfully carrying out intelligence efforts may request that relevant organs, organizations, and citizens provide necessary support, assistance, and cooperation.
Article 15: As needed for work, and in accordance with relevant national provisions, national intelligence work institutions may employ technical investigation measures, and measures for the protection of identities, upon completion of strict approval formalities.
Article 16: When national intelligence work institutions staff lawfully perform their tasks in accordance with relevant national provisions, with approvals and upon the presentation of relevant identification, they may enter relevant restricted areas and venues; may learn from and question relevant institutions, organizations, and individuals; and may read or collect relevant files, materials or items.
Article 17: As needed to carry out urgent tasks, the staff of national intelligence work institutions may enjoy transit facilitation upon presentation of relevant identification.
As necessary for their work, the staff of national intelligence work institutions may, in accordance with relevant national provisions, have priority use of, or lawfully requisition, state organs', organizations' or individuals' transportation or communications tools, premises and buildings; and when necessary, they may set up relevant work sites, equipment, and facilities; and after the completion of the task, these shall be promptly returned, or restored to their original condition, and the corresponding fees are to be paid in accordance with provisions, and compensation shall be made where there are damages caused.
Article 18: As required for work, and in accordance with relevant national provisions, national intelligence work institutions may ask organs such as for customs and entry-exit border inspection to provide facilitation such as exemptions from inspection.
Article 19: National intelligence work institutions and their staffs shall handle matters strictly in accordance with law, and must not exceed or abuse their authority, must not violate the lawful rights and interests of citizens and organizations, must not use their position to facilitate seeking benefits for themselves or others, and must not leak state secrets, commercial secrets, and personal information.
Chapter III Protections for National Intelligence Work
Article 20: National intelligence work institutions and their staffs carrying out intelligence efforts in accordance with law receive the protection of law.
Article 21: The State is to strengthen the establishment of national intelligence work institutions, and implement special management for their institutional setup, personnel, allotments, funding, and assets; and shall grant special safeguards.
The State is to establish management systems suited to the needs of intelligence work, such as for hiring, transferring, evaluating, training, benefits and departure of personnel.
Article 22: National intelligence work institutions shall adapt [and be suited to] to the needs of intelligence work, and increase capacity for carrying out intelligence efforts.
National intelligence work institutions shall use scientific and technical techniques, increasing the level of distinction, screening, synthesis and analytic assessment of intelligence information.
Article 23: When the personal safety of the staffs of national intelligence work institutions, personnel who have established cooperative relationships with national intelligence work institutions, or their close relatives, is threatened as a result of assisting national intelligence work; the relevant state departments shall employ the necessary measures to protect or rescue them.
Article 24: The state shall arrange appropriate placements for persons who have made contributions to national intelligence efforts and require a placement.
Relevant departments, such as for public security, civil affairs, finance, health, education, human resources and social security, veterans affairs, and healthcare security, as well as state-owned enterprises and public institutions, shall assist national intelligence work institutions in completing work on placements.
Article 25: Corresponding bereavement benefits and special treatment are given tin accordance with relevant national provisions, to those who are disabled, give their lives, or die as a result of carrying out, supporting, assisting, or cooperating with national intelligence efforts.
Where individuals or organizations suffer losses to assets caused because they supported, assisted, and cooperated with national security work; compensation is given in accordance with relevant national provisions.
Article 26: The national intelligence work institutions shall establish and complete systems for strict supervision and security review, conduct oversight of their staff's compliance with laws and discipline, and lawfully employ necessary measures, conducting periodic or unscheduled security reviews.
Article 27: Any individual or organization has the right to make a report or accusation about national intelligence work institutions or their staffs exceeding the scope of their authority. abusing their authority, or other conduct in violation of laws or discipline. Relevant organs receiving reports or accusations shall promptly investigate and inform the informant or accuser of the results of the inspection.
Individuals and organizations lawfully making reports or accusations about national intelligence work institutions and their staffs must not be suppressed or retaliated against by any individual or organization.
National intelligence work institutions shall provide convenient channels for individuals and organizations making reports, accusations, or feedback on situations, and preserve the confidentiality of the informant or accuser.
Chapter IV: Legal Responsibility
Article 28: Where provisions of this Law are violated by obstructing national intelligence work institutions and their staffs' lawful carrying out of intelligence work, the national intelligence work institutions are to recommend the relevant units give sanctions, or the state security organs and public security organs are to give warnings or up to 15 days of detention; where a crime is constituted, criminal responsibility is pursued in accordance with law.
Article 29: Where state secrets related to national intelligence efforts are leaked, the national intelligence work institutions are to recommend that the relevant units give sanctions or that the state security organs or public security organs give warnings or detention of up to 15 days; where a crime is constituted, criminal responsibility is pursued in accordance with law.
Article 30: Where one pretends to be staff of a national intelligence work institution or other relevant personnel to perpetrate acts such as deception, fraud, extortion or blackmail, they are punished in accordance with the provisions of the "People's Republic of China Public Security Administrative Punishments Law"; and where a crime is constituted, criminal responsibility is pursued in accordance with law.
Article 31: Where national intelligence work institutions or their staffs exceed or abuse their authority, violate the lawful rights and interests of citizens and organizations, use their position to facilitate seeking benefits for themselves or others, or leaking state secrets, commercial secrets and personal information; they are punished in accordance with law; and where a crime is constituted, criminal responsibility is pursued in accordance with law.
Chapter V: Supplementary Provisions
Article 32: This Law takes effect June 28, 2017.
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