Exclusive focus: Why China’s exclusionary rules won’t stop police torture.

China has just released a new document aimed at deterring police abuses by strictly excluding coerced confessions and other illegal evidence from criminal trials.

It won’t work.

While there is some interesting new content, it is overshadowed by major problems and the failure to resolve problems that have long plagued China’s exclusionary rules. Among other major issues, the new rules inexplicably impede defense attorneys’ access to some of the most critical evidence for requesting exclusion, which will inevitably cast doubt on the legitimacy of the entire process.

Background

By way of quick overview, rules for the exclusion of illegal evidence have been the centerpiece of China’s struggle to prevent wrongful convictions since 2010. Despite being formally incorporated into China’s Criminal Procedure Law in 2012 and refined in subsequent interpretations and rules, their measurable impact has been minimal.

‘Exclusion of evidence’ essentially means that statements extracted by torture or other abusive techniques cannot be used as the basis of a conviction. Where physical evidence or documents are collected in violation of procedures, an explanation must be given for those defects before they may be used as evidence- and courts have discretion in deciding when the explanation is adequate. The burden is on the State to convince the court of the legality of evidence collection once it is cast into doubt.

China’s “exclusionary rules” have been generally viewed as playing two possible roles[i]:

(1) Deterring police misconduct by making clear that police will not derive any benefit from illegal conduct; and

(2) Preventing wrongful convictions of innocents by excluding unverifiable or untrustworthy evidence.

The first of these goals, de-incentivizing misconduct, is how the U.S. justifies excluding evidence gained through illegal searches and seizures. The idea, put simply, is that police violate procedures (and suspects’ rights) because they want to solve cases and secure convictions, but that if police knew such misconduct would actually result in losing convictions, they would be more motivated to meticulously follow the rules. In order for such a strategy to be effective, however, police must truly receive no benefit at all from the use of illegal practices. This is why the U.S. legal system employs a “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to exclude not only the evidence acquired directly through the misconduct, but also any subsequent evidence gained as a result of that initial illegality.

China’s exclusionary rules have no equivalent doctrine, so even if the rules were routinely and rigorously enforced, torture might still yield admissible evidence. A confession might occasionally be lost when found to be coerced, but the excluded confession might still contain clues as to the location of a murder weapon, the identities of additional suspects, or other evidence sufficient to gain a conviction. In some actual cases, police or prosecutors who knew that a confession should be excluded have simply conducted a new ‘lawful’ interrogation to get a confession they could use in court. So long as sufficient collaborating evidence is found, the use of torture during investigations is unlikely to alter the case outcomes.

The rules have always been more clearly focused on the second possible goal, which is preventing wrongful convictions. Several such cases have recently been overturned by China’s government, although not always in time to save the accused’s life. Wrongful convictions are not only unjust, but also threaten the legitimacy of the entire criminal process and inflame public passions leading to unrest. Releasing someone who is factually guilty on procedural grounds is likely also viewed by many as equally unjust and harmful to the system’s legitimacy.  Torture of someone who ultimately appears to be guilty, however, seems to be something many are prepared to overlook.

Preventing wrongful cases is obviously an important goal, but it should be distinguished from the question of regulating police. This kind of exclusion is more about the reliability of evidence, than deterrent value. While unfortunately there remain advocates of coercive interrogation techniques, the global consensus has long been that information given under extreme duress is simply unreliable. This is the main grounds for excluding ‘involuntary’ confessions in the U.S.  A healthy skepticism of confessions, apart from exclusionary rules, is also codified in Article 53 of China’s Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that they must not be the sole basis for conviction.

If Chinese exclusion of evidence is most concerned with reliability, other systems should be put in place to stop police misconduct. The use of torture to extract confessions is a crime in China, of course, and prosecutions of torturers might more directly deter such abuses, but in practice such prosecutions are even less common than invocations of the exclusionary rules. Were police abuses pursued with even half the vigor and public attention put into China’s anti-corruption campaign, the situation might be different.

The new rules

In looking at the new rules, the most prominent problems relate to several issues routinely identified by lawyers and academics:

 1. Repeat confessions: As mentioned above, China’s exclusionary rules do not contain a ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine excluding all evidence derived from an initial violation. This means that even after a confession is excluded as coerced; it may still be replaced by a new confession that was conducted under better conditions. Of course, once an accused’s rights have been violated, perhaps violently, he may well believe that he will be harmed again should he now recant. Also, having confessed once, it is just easier to do so a second time, especially where the suspect or defendant may well not understand the ramifications of the first confession having been excluded.

The new document attempts to address this situation with a very narrow rule blocking the use of some derivative evidence.  Article 5 begins by saying that where an initial confession is excluded as the product of torture, similar subsequent confessions are to be excluded as well, if also made due to the influence of that initial torture. This is a good rule, if difficult for courts to apply, but it should stop there, with all such confessions being considered unreliable.

Instead, the rule goes on to provide exceptions allowing that a new confession may still be admitted so long as the interrogation is conducted by new questioners who inform the accused of their rights and potential liability before the accused makes a new similar confession. It simply isn’t realistic to think that any degree of warnings could ensure the voluntariness and reliability of such a confession. By the terms of the exception, it applies only to an actual victim of torture, again approached by authorities questioning them on the subject that resulted in their torture before.  Regardless of whether it is new police officers, prosecutors, or judges who now questions them, it is impossible to believe that the new confession is not entirely the product of the earlier torture.

It should be repeated that Article 5 applies only to situations of confessions extracted through torture, and not to those resulting from other illegal interrogation tactics. This means that where the violation is improper confinement, or methods such as subjecting the accused to cold, hunger, sunlight, heat, or fatigue during interrogation, a new confession is not impacted.[ii]

 2. Medical Inspection Records/ Interrogation Recordings. While the State bears the ultimate burden of showing that evidence was lawfully obtained, the defense will want to provide evidence refuting this. Among the most obvious pieces of evidence for demonstrating physical abuse are records of accused’s medical inspections performed by the detention center, and recordings of the interrogations, if any.

Detention centers are required to create physical inspection records during intake, including photos of any existing injuries, providing a valuable record showing whether new injuries appeared while in custody. [iii]Interrogators are required to make A/V recordings of interrogations in major cases, and are allowed to do so in other cases.[iv] These systems are in place specifically for the purpose of preventing torture and other coercion, but lawyers have previously indicated difficulties in accessing these materials. Medical records are often not provided at all, and viewing of the often very lengthy tapes of multiple interrogations must often be done in judges’ chambers, during work hours, rather than at the lawyers’ convenience.

Rather than fix these problems, the new rules essentially codify them. Article 21, provides that lawyers are to have full access to several important pieces of evidence as soon as the investigation is with the prosecutors at the end of investigation. The available evidence includes any official decision to restrict the accused’s freedom, written records of interrogations, logs of their being brought for interrogation, etc.  The most critical evidence regarding abuse in custody, the recordings of interrogation and the medical inspections reports, however, can expressly be withheld.

Where the prosecution does not hand over medical inspection report or recordings in its possession, the defense may apply to the court to collect them. Article 22 provides that the court is to conduct a review before giving them to the defense, however, and give them to the defense only where it finds that these materials are relevant to proving the legality of the evidence gathering. Even assuming the courts earnestly and fairly perform their duties, whenever the evidence is not provided; failure to disclose the materials in a case about government misconduct will cast a shadow over the entire proceedings.

The court is required to explain why it has not given the materials, but the explanation may well begin and end with a recitation of the law- they were not provided because they are not relevant- without further clarification. Frankly, it is difficult to imagine when the medical inspections of a party alleging physical abuse would not be directly relevant. It is also difficult to understand what legitimate goal could be served by denying a detainee access to his own medical records or interrogation footage when he requests it to prepare for trial.

 3. Investigator appearances at court. The investigators alleged to have perpetrated misconduct in investigations rarely testify at court. This means that the defense is unable to question them in court to challenge their testimony. The courts have discretion to summon investigators to court where they find it is necessary to resolve doubts about the legality of the investigation tactics. It rarely happens. Other reforms are encouraging greater appearance of witnesses in criminal trials, but nothing in the new rules helps clarify when an appearance is necessary and when investigators should appear.

Investigators appearance in court is critical to a fair trial, but is also an important opportunity for policing reforms. The trial can expose abuses, and also become a forum for investigators, the court, and defense to discuss the propriety of investigative conduct through specific examples. This feedback is essential to changing practices, and refining concepts of fairness.

Like the preceding problem, barriers to investigators’ appearances, this problem also limit the role of lawyers. Both show that the exclusionary rules are not intended to empower lawyers as an independent check on police misconduct, or an equal force in the prevention of wrongful convictions.

[i] Other possible justifications for exclusion invoked in other nations have rarely been mentioned in China, including protection of the integrity of the courts, which would be blemished by implicit condoning of illegal evidence gathering if such evidence was allowed to support convictions.

[ii] Item 8- SPC opinion – a previous refinement of prohibited interrogation tactics, listing these conditions as separate from the use of torture to extract confessions.

[iii] Article 13

[iv] Article 10

日前，中国发布了《关于办理刑事案件严格排除非法证据若干问题的规定》，目的是通过严格排除刑事审判中强迫性供述以及其他非法证据，来威慑警察侵权。

但是，这很难行得通。

虽然《规定》中存在些有意思的新内容，但《规定》本身仍存在问题，同时也无法彻底解决长期以来困扰中国非法证据排除制度的症结。其中一个显著的问题是，《规定》阻碍律师获得用于申请排除非法证据的关键证据。这让人不禁质疑整个刑事程序的合法性。）

背景

自2010年开始，中国就将排除非法证据作为防止冤假错案的核心手段。2012年《刑事诉讼法》正式确立了非法证据排除规则，随后最高法和最高检也通过司法解释进一步完善了实施机制，但是排除规则的实施效果微乎其微。

“排除非法证据”主要指由刑讯逼供或者其他非法手段取得的供述不能作为定罪的依据。当取得物证或书证的过程存在程序瑕疵时，控方应当作出合理解释或者补正瑕疵，法院才可以将之采纳作为证据。同时，法院拥有裁量权来判断控方的解释是否充分。当法院对于证据取得的合法性存在疑问时，控方应当承担证明责任。

一般而言，中国的“非法证据排除规则”被认为能够发挥两个可能的作用 [i]：

（1）威慑警察的不当行为 即通过让警察知道其不会从违法行为中获得任何利益来实现

（2）防止冤假错案- 即通过排除无法核实或者不可靠的证据来实现

第一个目标，减少违法行为对侦查人员的激励，也是美国排除通过非法搜查、扣押获得证据的理由。简单来说，警察以违反程序（以及侵犯被告人的权利）的方式来进行侦查，就是因为他们希望破案，确保定罪。但是，如果警察知道他们的不当行为反而会导致排除证据并难以定罪，那么他们将会更主动、认真地遵守规则。然而，为了达到这一目的，警察必须无法从非法行为中得到任何利益。这也是为什么美国确立“毒树之果”理论的原因：不仅排除违法行为直接获得的证据， 也要排除由最初违法行为获得的所有的派生证据。

中国仍然没有确立“毒树之果”规则，因此，即使司法机关严格执行新颁布的《规定》，法院仍可能采信通过刑讯逼供获得的证据。当侦查人员非法收集嫌疑人、被告人的供述时，供述本身可能会被法院排除，但通过该供述发现的本案其他线索，仍可以来确定凶器的位置、其他嫌疑人的身份和其他证据，这些派生证据足以支持有罪判决。 在一些实际案例中，当警察或者检察官明知供述可能被排除，就会继续实施一个新的“合法”讯问，来获得可以在法庭上使用的证据。只要能发现充足的补强证据，在侦查中使用的刑讯逼供等非法行为就不会对判决结果产生实质性的影响。

在中国，非法证据排除规则更多被期待发挥第二个作用，即避免冤假错案。中国政府近来纠正了若干错案，但不是每次都可以挽回无辜者的生命。错案不仅是司法不公正的问题，更会削弱整个刑事程序的合法性，也可能引发公众激愤而导致社会不稳定。因为程序问题而释放一个事实上有罪的人，在许多人看来也是一样的不公正，同样也会危及刑事司法制度的合法性。然而，一旦被告人被最终定罪，之前他被刑讯逼供的事实往往就被人们忽略了。

毫无疑问，防止错案是一个重要目标，但是应当与规制警察行为这个问题有所区分。这种排除更多是证据可靠性问题，而不是必然起到威慑警察的效果。不幸的是，依然有人对于强迫讯问技巧非常推崇。然而，国内外的研究和实务都已经认识到，通过严重威胁嫌疑人、被告人的方式收集到的信息是非常不可靠的。这是美国排除“非自愿”供述的主要理由。除了非法证据排除规则，中国刑诉法第53条对口供问题提出了另一个警示，即不能依据单独的口供定罪。

如果中国的非法证据排除更多考虑的是定罪证据的可靠性，那么就应当建立其他机制来遏制警察的非法行为。刑讯逼供也是中国刑法规定的一项罪名，追究刑讯逼供者的刑事责任可能会更直接地威慑类似的侵权犯罪行为。 但是，刑事逼供罪的案件非常少，甚至比排除非法证据的案子还要少。如果中国政府拿出“反腐”的一半决心和 一半精力来解决警察滥权的问题，情况可能会有不同。

新规定

查看这些新规定，最突出的问题也是律师和学者们经常讨论的问题，包括：

1.   重复供述问题：如前文所述，中国没有确立排除“毒树之果”的规则，来排除所有源自于初次违法所获的一系列证据。也就是说，即使非法收集的供述被排除，它也可能被其他没有受到胁迫的新供述而替代。然而，当嫌疑人、被告人遭受侵权甚至可能是暴力侵权后，他很可能由于因为担心改变证词而遭受第二次侵害，所以无法作出自愿的供述。而且，一旦第一次承认有罪，就非常容易再次确认先前的有罪供述，特别是嫌疑人、被告人往往不太理解第一次供述已经被排除的法律后果。

针对这个问题，此次新《规定》尝试设立了特别的规则来限制使用一些派生证据。《规定》第5条指出，通过刑讯逼供行为收集的供述应当予以排除，之后犯罪嫌疑人、被告人受该刑讯逼供行为影响而作出的与该供述相同的重复性供述，应当一并排除。该规则目前适用起来尚存困难，但总体来说是一个进步。 遗憾的是，《规定》第5条的内容并没有在此中止，没有明确要求一律排除重复供述。

相反，第5条随后规定了采信重复供述的例外情形，允许在更换讯问主体后， 由其他侦查人员进行讯问并告知诉讼权利和认罪的法律后果的，嫌疑人自愿作出的重复供述可以被采纳。但是，我们有理由怀疑， 任何程度的警告是否都可以保障重复供述的自愿性和可靠性。此外，例外条款仅仅适用于实际遭受刑讯逼供的受害者，即使更换了讯问主体来再次讯问同一个问题，我们也难以相信新的供述不是在之前刑讯逼供行为的影响下作出的。

需要再强调的是，《规定》第5条仅仅适用于通过刑讯逼供行为获得的供述，并不包括由其他非法讯问手段获得的供述。这也就是说，当非法行为表现为不当拘禁，或者在讯问中使用冻、饿、晒，烤，疲劳战术，重复供述将不适用于该规定，也就无需予以排除 [ii]。

2.   体检记录/讯问时的录音录像。按照中国非法证据排除规则的规定，控方承担最终的证明责任，来证明证据是合法取得的，辩方仍提出证据加以反驳。最能清楚证明身体受到伤害的证据，莫过于看守所提供的被告人的身体检查记录，以及讯问时的录音录像。

在收监的时候，看守所应当制作身体检查记录，包括一切有伤痕的照片。这能提供一个有价值的记录，来对比判断日后在羁押期间是否有新的伤痕。[iii]侦查人员在重大案件的讯问中应当进行录音录像，在其他一般案件中也可以这么做。[iv]这些制度的设计都是为了防止刑讯逼供和使用其他强迫的手段。但是，很多刑事辩护律师都表示，实务中非常难以获得这些材料。看守所基本不会提供体检记录。在那些存在录音录像资料的案件中，律师要花很长的时间来查阅。而且，查阅录音录像一般只能在法官的工作时间和办公室内进行，这对于律师来说非常不方便。

《规定》非但不能解决这些问题，实际上加剧了这些问题。其中第21条规定，辩护律师自人民检察院对案件审查起诉之日起，可以查阅、摘抄、复制讯问笔录、提讯登记、采取强制措施或者侦查措施的法律文书等证据材料。关于在羁押期间是否遭受刑讯逼供等非法讯问等最为重要的证据，以及记录讯问过程的录音录像和身体检查记录则明确可以不提供。

如果控方不提供其掌握的检查记录或者录音录像，律师可以向法院申请调取这些材料。第22条规定说法院在提供给律师之前要进行审查，而且只有在其认为这些材料与证据收集合法性相关时才提供给律师。假定法庭会切实公平地履行这一职责，但在案件可能涉及到政府的不当行为时，相关重要的证据材料却没有提交，一定会给整个诉讼程序蒙上阴影。

法院需要对不予提供这些材料作出解释，但这些解释很可能就是自始至终在重复法律条文，说不予提供这些材料是因为它们与证据收集的合法性没有联系，而不会提供更具体的解释。坦率地说，很难想象当被告人主张受到身体虐待时，在什么样的情况下检查记录才不具有直接的关联性。同样，我们也很难理解，当被羁押的被告人要求提供他们自己的身体检查报告和审讯的录音录像片段来准备庭审时，能有什么样的正当理由来拒绝他们的申请。

3. 侦查人员出庭作证。被指控存在非法行为的侦查人员很少出庭作证。也就是说，辩方没有机会在法庭上询问或质疑他们的证词。只有当法院认为现有证据材料不能证明证据收集的合法性，并且确有必要通知侦查人员出庭作证时，才会考虑要求他们出庭作证。但是，这样的情形鲜有发生。虽然目前有其他一些改革措施鼓励证人在刑事审判中出庭作证，但《规定》中没有任何内容能帮助法官们判断什么是”确有必要”以及什么时候应当要求侦查人员出庭

侦查人员出庭作证不仅对公正审判至关重要，更是为警察制度改革提供了一个重要机会。庭审可以暴露出侦查人员的非法讯问行为，同时也是为侦查人员、法官以及辩方提供一个对话平台，通过一些具体的案例来探讨侦查行为是否合法。这些反馈意见对于改变现状以及重新定义公正审判有很重要的作用。

如上述问题一样，侦查人员出庭的难题也限制了律师的作用。这两个问题都表明，非法证据排除规则不是为了要发挥律师作用，作为独立一方来制约警察的非法行为，或者作为一个平等的力量来防止错案。